Business as Mission & Lessons Drawn from 19th century Hawaii—Part Two

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Abstract

Part One of this paper addressed the positive and negative role "Business as mission" (BAM) played in 19th century Hawaii; its negative side being its contributory role to the loss of Hawaii's monarchy (1893) and its independence (1898)—a tragedy contrary to the wishes of all the early actors, both native and foreign, who had embraced "business as mission." This paper, Part Two, focuses on the lessons that can be drawn from this history. Too often the tale is told simplistically as one where the missionaries, or their descendants, lost their mission and greedily took over the kingdom. This paper concludes, rather, that serious mistakes were made on both sides: native Hawaiian and foreign-descended Hawaiians. It highlights native Hawaiian leaders' own fateful, if understandable, embrace of "economic development" as the way forward for their nation; followed up by native Hawaiian commoners' own economic falling behind; the result being a deeply divided society, which then set up a social tinderbox all-too-ready for conflagration should certain incendiary personalities strike the match—which is precisely what happened with Lorrin Thurston, King Kalākaua and Queen Liliuokalani. Hawaii's history teaches important lessons: the need to understand and value cultural norms and values, the need to identify how economic gains impact the culture, and the need to be willing and able peacekeepers in the process of doing BAM.

Key words: business, mission, Hawaii, ABCFM, BAM, government, history, politics, haole

¹ I write "fateful" not only because of its ultimately negative consequences (Hawaii's downfall) but also because it was almost inevitable given Hawaiians' *mana* culture. Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins explains how the basic Hawaiian value mana drove not only to economic betterment, but, fatefully, to conspicuous consumption:

Nineteenth century traders, missionaries and voyagers often remarked how fashion-conscious the Hawaiians were.... In the 1820s, the acquisition of fashionable clothing assumed orginatic proportions. The proceeds of the sandalwood trade lie rotting in chiefly storehouses of cloth, to be dumped finally in the ocean.

Yet, again, one is in the presence of something familiarly Hawaiian: a structure of the long run—mana. Perhaps most essentially, mana is the creative power Hawaiians describe as making visible what is invisible, causing things to be seen, which is the same as making them known or giving them form. Hence the divine mana of chiefs is manifest in their brilliance, their shining. This, as much as corpulence, was the "beauty" that marked a chiefly status.... To the extent, then, of the Hawaiian market, the European mode of production and trade in the 1820s was organized by the Polynesian conception of mana. (M. Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the early history of the Sandwich Islands kingdom (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1981), 29-31)

Twenty years later Sahlins reinforced his point about the economic influence of Hawaiians' concept of *mana*, writing:

[T]he *ali'i* turned to an unrestrained competition among themselves in conspicuous consumption.... The effects were disastrous for ... everyone.... Merchants were ruined, while the Hawaiian elite were left with a large debt.

The debt is a direct testimony to the contribution of the Hawaiian system in its own demise – how it actually amplified the ... "effect" of world capitalism.... Their consuming frenzy represented a Polynesian political economy of grandeur. *Mana* was a powerful source of their desire. The chiefs' debt was the ... magnification of the destructive impetus of capitalism by the creative powers of *mana*. (P. Kirch and M. Sahlins, *Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the Kingdom of Hawaii*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 57-8)

It is oft-asserted that a chief cause of Hawaii's downfall (the loss of its independence as a nation) was that the missionaries and their descendants "came to do good, but ended up doing well." That is, they lost their mission and the Hawaiians paid the consequence. This charge is further refined by three other critiques which identify broader currents as the cause of Hawaii's downfall: first, a broad cultural critique focusing on foreigners' cultural imperialism; second, a more narrowly economic critique focusing on the harmful results of the introduction of foreigners' capitalist system with its alien notions of private land ownership; and lastly, a focus on rank racism as the real, underlying problem.

This paper will be examining these positions, and others; both the mistakes made by well-intentioned missionaries and native Hawaiians. These mistakes had consequences; in Hawaii's case, her political downfall. Identifying these mistakes from Hawaii's history can teach important lessons for today's BAM practitioners, missteps to avoid in order to bring the blessing that is intended.

Dr. Jonathan Osorio is a chief exponent of the "cultural imperialism" critique—the first of the three common critiques identified above. He writes:

It is a story of how colonialism worked in Hawai'i not through the naked seizure of lands and governments but through a slow, insinuating invasion of people, ideas, and institutions ... that ... literally and figuratively dismembered that lāhui (the people) from their traditions, their lands, and ultimately their government.³

Osorio sees this colonialism especially in the way western notions of the authority of "law" undermined and replaced hallowed, indigenous notions of kingly authority. But even a pro-native Hawaiian historian such as Donovan Preza disagrees with Osorio's analysis of this "insinuating colonialism," writing:

Evidence was presented [in Preza's research] explaining how Hawaiian custom was incorporated into the law. Decisions from Hawaiian Kingdom Supreme Court cases were used to show that even the foreign judges of the time were interpreting land law through "Hawaiian eyes". Hawaiian custom was the authority in such decisions and not American or British common law. Such evidence refutes arguments by Osorio (2002) and Stauffer (2004) suggesting that the legal system was American dominated.⁵

Dr. Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa, while sharing Osorio's general cultural critique, particularly focuses on economic factors: the 1848 land redistribution of the Great Māhele—and the capitalism behind it—as a key trigger to Hawaii's downfall. She writes:

² That is, the argument is that the missionaries came with a mission to bless the Hawaiians—materially as well as spiritually—but ended up by themselves being blessed materially, while the Hawaiians got left behind.

³ J. Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 2002), 3. Kealani Cook similarly argues that the haoles seized the high ground of "cultural power" and airily dismissed Hawaiian ideas as simply another expression of "native inferiority." (K. Cook, "Kahiki Hawaiian Relationships with other Pacific Islanders, 1850-1915" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2011),145)

⁴ Osorio writes, "The Rights and Laws of 1839 ... made startling changes in the authority of the chiefs and the Mō'ī [the king].... Our submission to the language of the law ... is what, I believe, has so altered our sense of ourselves and our inherent sovereignty." (Osorio 2002:25, 251)

⁵ D. Preza, "The Empirical Writes Back: Re-Examining Hawaiian Dispossession Resulting from the Māhele of 1848" (Master's thesis, University of Hawai'i, 2010), 113. Mark 'Umi Perkins' PhD also takes issue with the "colonialist" interpretation—whereby foreign law was "imposed" upon Hawaii—as put forward by Osorio, Kame'eleihiwa and Marion Kelly, instead arguing that:

^{...} this passage presages the emergence of a *legal pluralism*, in which a multi-layered system of legal understandings resulted from the overwriting of one legal system on another.... [T]he Kingdom legal system was already a hybrid of "traditional" Hawaiian norms and "western" concepts of law. (M. Perkins, "Kuleana: A Genealogy of Native Tenant Rights" (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 2013), 39, 42, 205)

Recently, much attention has been focused on the 1893 overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani and the demise of the Hawaiian monarchy. But the real loss of Hawaiian sovereignty began with the 1848 Māhele, when the Mō'ī [the king] and Ali'i Nui [higher chiefs] lost ultimate control of the 'Āina [the land].⁶

This loss of the land, she asserts, only occurred because Hawaiians were persuaded to adopt a foreign capitalist system based on private property:

The *Māhele* transformed the traditional Land system from one of communal tenure to private ownership on the capitalist model.... In the Hawaiian world, the hallmark of civilization was, and still is, generosity; that is, the willingness to share one's waiwai (accumulated wealth).19 Hawaiian generosity was thus diametrically opposed to the basic tenets of capitalism.⁷

But even Native Hawaiian historians sympathetic to the general tenor of both Jonathan Osorio and Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa disagree with their notion that Hawaiians were insidiously co-opted by Western notions, blindly surrendering their own cultural and land values. Donovan Preza argues instead that:

... the Māhele was not the sufficient condition for dispossession ... [rather] that besides severe depopulation, the loss of control over governance due to the overthrow was the leading cause of dispossession in Hawai'i.... This post-Māhele model was definitely of European origins. But it was not a model that mimicked the British and American model; it was adapted to Hawaiian custom.⁸

Also taking issue with Kame'eleihiwa, Dr. Mark 'Umi' Perkins rejects scholarship which "cast Hawaiians as passive victims in this process ... to a 'modern' Western-modeled land tenure." They were not victims; rather "Hawaiian agency in the transition" was central. The new land system, Perkins argues, was not foisted upon unsophisticated natives by clever foreigners, but rather the new political economy expressed in the Māhele was "co-created by Hawaiian and foreign elites." 10

Lastly, rank racism is suggested as the chief contributor to Hawaii's downfall. Dr. Ron Williams alleges this as the motivating factor in the "Sons of the Mission"—active both within and without the ecclesiastical realm—from the 1860s onwards, arguing

White administrators of the AEH [Hawaiian Evangelical Association] ... launched an effort to defend their positions of influence and control by crafting a purposeful narrative concerning Christianity that claimed an inherent white supremacy and Native deficiency.... Race was the foundational issue upon which the calls by AEH officers for white leadership over church and state in Hawai'i were based. A white Christian was inherently the superior citizen, pastor, and leader. 11

But Williams' thesis is unconvincing in that it directly contradicts the fundamental conviction motivating Evangelical missionaries' central mission in 19th century Hawaii: preaching for conversion. Preaching for conversion is based on the hope for change—that one's listener *can*

⁶ L. Kame'el.eihiwa, *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea La E Pono Ai? How Shall We Live in Harmony?* Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, Kindle Edition, 2012), loc. 588.

⁷ Kame'eleihiwa 2012:loc. 427-345, 487.

⁸ Preza 2010:53, 98. See too the work of Mark 'Umi Perkins.

⁹ Perkins 2013:7.

¹⁰ Perkins 2013:100.

¹¹ R. Williams, "Claiming Christianity: The Struggle over God and Nation in Hawai'i, 1880-1900" (Phd diss., University of Hawaii, 2013), 4, 201, 222. Joy Schulz's PhD research also alleges rank racism to have been an underlying problem for the Hawaiian missionaries' children. (See J. Schulz, *Empire of the Young: Missionary Children in Hawai'i and the Birth of U.S. Colonialism in the Pacific, 1820-1898* (Phd diss., University of Nebraska, 2011), v).

¹² Williams points out that even the post-1863 "new mission" leaders in Hawaii continued in the revivalistic emphasis—with its focus on preaching for conversion—of the early missionaries to Hawaii. So, for instance, as a centerpiece for their "new mission," the AEH leaders sent off the native Hawaiian John Henry Wise for three years

change; that he or she has the ability to be moved by words and thoughts to a better life. But racism, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, is "a belief that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race." But if race is the "primary determinant" of people's activity—such that their morality, beliefs, and way of life was fixed according to their genes—then what would be the point of preaching?

No, 19th-century missionaries to Hawaii's view on race was well-expressed by *The Friend*, the Honolulu-based weekly which for decades was the missionaries' voice in Hawaii:

Prejudice is the result of ignorance, and indeed we may almost say that it is identical with ignorance.... It is always of rankest growth in unenlightened countries, and among the least cultivated classes.... We often meet with individuals who exhibit a prejudice which appears to us the most unreasonable of all prejudices,—that against color or race....

... God hath made of one blood all nations, and the day is not far distant we hope when all will treat each other as children of the common Father, and common followers of a common Saviour.¹⁴

This paper will take a very different approach from those of either Osorio, Kame'eleihiwa or Williams. It agrees that they accurately identify foreign contact as the fundamental trigger for Hawaii's downfall (a two-fold downfall: Hawaii's loss of its monarchy with the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani in 1893 and then the loss of its political independence in 1898 through its annexation by the United States.) That is, without foreign contact, certainly Hawaii would have continued on much as it was before. However, this paper differs on the question of, "What was it about that foreign contact that caused the downfall?"

Osorio's, Kame'eleihiwa's and Williams' approaches lean toward the "conspiratorial" bad people ripped off the innocents. They read Hawaii's 19th century history of foreign contact as a deliberate plan by cunning outsiders to unseat Hawaiians. This paper interprets the events less through the lens of "conspiracy" and far more through that of "mistakes," mistakes made by both

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of theological training at Oberlin (Ohio), a center of revivalistic training, expecting he would return as a key preacher and force for Hawaii's spiritual renewal. See Williams 2013:67-68.

¹³ "Racism," Merriam-Webster. Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/racism

¹⁴ "Prejudice," *The Friend*, September 4, 1874; "The Month of June," *The Friend*, July 1, 1875:49. Henna-Riikka Pennanen, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland, studied six late 19th century American experts on China and Japan, four of whom had Protestant missionary roots. In her work she suggests that it was probably the American missionaries' belief in a biblically-grounded "monogenesis"—the original unity and homogeneity of the human race—versus the then-popular "polygenism"—the assumption that separate creations or evolutions had taken place on a number of occasions and in a number of places—which preserved them from a racism assuming the inherent inferiority of different races. "American Conceptions of Civilization in Late 19th Century Studies of 'things Chinese and Japanese'," (PhD diss., University of Jyväskylä, Finland, 2015), 94-. Available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b81d/542856f67e1138598dc54864f9be525176f6.pdf

¹⁵ Kame'eleihiwa expresses this conspiratorialist note most clearly, writing:

The American Kāhuna worked behind the scenes to consolidate their position and to gain time, time to raise their children and to teach them how to take over Hawai'i. To the outside world they presented themselves as merely political and economic advisors to an infant nation rising from the shackles of barbarism. In reality they were biding their time until they alone would rule Hawai'i. (Kame'eleihiwa 2012:loc. 5406)

While Osorio and Kame'eleihiwa understand this conspiracy to have been of long duration, rooted in the very early years of the missionaries' entrance into Hawaii in 1820, Williams is more moderate. He denies that Christianity from the beginning was "a tool of foreign usurpers," claiming only that racism began to predominate with the missionaries "new mission", starting gradually from 1863 onwards. (see Williams 2013:vi, 4, 35, 220)
¹⁷ It is not that secret conspiracies did not play a significant role at key moments. One can think of the Committee of Thirteen and their role in bringing about the Bayonet Constitution, of the Committee of Safety's role in

native Hawaiians and outsiders. Especially were these mistakes made in the introduction of economic development. This paper's assumption, then, is that as the process began, large-hearted, well-meaning individuals were at work on both sides. But they made mistakes, and as the decades rolled on, these mistakes grew larger in their consequences. The stakes now being higher, debate over the mistakes grew more heated; individuals, both native and foreign, took increasingly harder positions; divisions grew wider and a state of political war ensued; and in war one side wins and the other side loses. Which is what happened in Hawaii's downfall. What some of these fundamental mistakes were is examined below.

Business is a two-edged sword

What is immediately clear from history is that business—even "business as mission"—is a two-edged sword. ¹⁸ It can bring blessing, and it can bring risks. This is clear from Hawaii's loss of her monarchy and political independence, largely through the clash between the monarchy and business interests. For business to be the blessing it is meant to be, a clear awareness of its dangers is the first step in avoiding them.

This is not to say that neither the native Hawaiians nor the foreigners who introduced their business practices were unaware of the risks.¹⁹ Awareness of risk is one thing; how to successfully sideline it, is another. But awareness is the first step.

Business carries culture—both its richness & its danger

The second lesson from Hawaii's story is a reminder that "business" is not culturally neutral; hence it carries the potential for cultural dissonance with it. This was certainly the case for Hawaii where the "production for exchange" introduced by the New England missionaries clashed with Hawaiians' "production for use" mentality. Anthropologists explain the work culture of some Polynesian groups not as "laziness" but rather as a different kind of rationality:

Unlike the ... abstract rationality of gain connected with the Protestant Ethic, the Hawaiians had definite ideas of what ... could easily satisfy these concrete "needs.".... "If the native Hawaiian is supplied with food and clothing, he is satisfied. ... the heaven is above, the earth is below.... There is no need of seeking further." Hawaiian labor speaks to a different kind of economic behavior.... The people were working to a classic pattern of production for use.²⁰

This clashed with the New Englander's "production for exchange" business model which aims then for a generation of surplus (which can be used then in exchange), this in turn entailing the scrimping and saving and demanding work schedule so typical of Weber's "Protestant Work

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overthrowing Queen Liliuokalani in 1893, and Queen Liliuokalani's own secret group writing up and then planning to suddenly launch her own rewritten constitution. No doubt they were key, but these conspiracies were but moments in a much larger ocean of events.

¹⁸ See Part One paper in this edition of this journal on Hawaii's history, where especially business' role in Hawaii's downfall is covered.

¹⁹ Awareness, however, is not the last or sufficient step. The worrying aspect of this point is that from early on many participants in Hawaii *were* aware of the dangers, as noted in the section "Still Pressed Ahead: to do Good despite the Risks" in this journal's "Part One—History" article on Hawaii.

²⁰ Kirch and Sahlins 1992:30

Ethic."²¹ In contrast, Hawaiian "production for use" merely aimed for subsistence needs, ²² which, with Hawaii's abundance, did not necessitate the New Englanders' scrimping and saving.

It was this "production for use" ethic which was behind Hawaiians' more carefree approach to work. Attributing this carefree attitude to 19th century Hawaiians is no mere stereotype of prejudiced Westerners. Above we have already mentioned world traveler Isabella Bird who having spent much time alone with the Hawaiians in her travels of 1872 wrote:

The Hawaiians are a most pleasant people to foreigners, but many of their ways are altogether aggravating. Unlike the Chinamen, they seldom do a thing right twice. In my experience, they have almost never saddled and bridled my horse quite correctly. Either a strap has been left unbuckled, or the blanket has been wrinkled under the saddle. They are too easy to care much about anything.²³

There are simply too many observations of a similar kind made about 19th century Hawaiians by both travelers and residents who admired their other qualities to dismiss it as simply as an ignorant stereotype. As Kealani Cook wrote, "Unlike the Chinese, Japanese, and *haole*, Native Hawaiians tended to stay away from mercantile operations ... in part because of a lack of interest in shop keeping, which had connotations of stinginess...." Hawaiian culture did not value shop keeping; thus it was not pursued. It is that simple.

These, of course, are the sort of cultural attitudes that would hold Native Hawaiians back from advancing economically. That it was not simply racial prejudice that was holding Native Hawaiians back is clear from the fate of the Chinese in Hawaii. 19th century Chinese were certainly not an accepted part of mainstream *haole* society, and additionally handicapped by limitations in their English language. Nevertheless, Chun Afong, arrived in Hawaii back in 1849, opened a mercantile store in Honolulu, invested his profits into real estate, and became that community's first millionaire. Sun De Zhang, the older brother of Sun Yat-sen, came to Hawai'i in 1871 to work in his uncle's store, and "by 1885 was the principal merchant on Maui, owned a six-thousand-acre ranch, and was known as the 'King of Maui." In 1880 a Honolulu resident observed, "It is significant that of the six hundred business houses in Honolulu not one is conducted by a native, while two hundred are controlled by the Chinese."

²¹ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, transl. Talcott Parsons (London & New York: Routledge Classics, 2001).

²² See P. Robbins, ed., *Encyclopedia of Environment and Society*, s.v. "Commodification," (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007), 309-310. "... with production for use being distinguished fundamentally from production driven by desire for exchange, and for profit.... [T]here is something quite different about producing (e.g., fishing) for subsistence needs as opposed to producing for exchange and the generation of surplus."

²³ I. Bird, *The Hawaiian Archipelago: Six Months Among the Palm Groves, Coral Reefs, & Volcanoes of the Sandwich Islands* (Miami: HardPress, Kindle Edition, 2017), loc. 3341-3358. While Isabella Bird was no professional anthropologist (Indeed, sociology (in which anthropology is rooted) as a formal academic discipline only began in 1895 with Emile Durkheim at the University of Bordeaux), her observations are cited as being from a) an outsider who had no attachment to any of the parties within Hawaii which might pull her one way or the other, and b) as from someone who had a great deal of enthusiasm for the Hawaiians, learning their language and mixing happily with the common people.

²⁴ Cook 2011:331-332. The negative connotations of "saving"—here interpreted as "stinginess"—were also reinforced by what Kirch and Sahlins call the "Polynesian political economy of grandeur," in which one must display one's greatness and *mana* by displays and outlay of wealth. (Kirch and Sahlins 1992:57-58)
²⁵ J. Haley, *Captive Paradise: A History of Hawaii* (New York: St. Martin's Press 2014, Kindle Edition), loc. 4674-

²⁵ J. Haley, Captive Paradise: A History of Hawaii (New York: St. Martin's Press 2014, Kindle Edition), loc. 4674-4683.

²⁶ S. Armstrong, "Lessons from the Hawaiian Islands," *The Journal of Christian Philosophy*, January 1884:200-229, 220.

None of these cultural attitudes holding Native Hawaiians back were necessarily in themselves problematic, had Hawaii not come in such close foreign contact. What was problematical was that these cultural attitudes on economics were not changing even while the Hawaiian leadership was advocating change and economic advance, and welcoming foreign contact as a necessary part of that development. This reminds me of C.S. Lewis' comment:

In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function. We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful.²⁷

The Hawaiians would never be part of this economic advance if they did not get on board with the—put roughly—"Protestant work ethic" that backed it. This was bound to be a ticking time bomb.

And this was the second problem with native Hawaiians' approach to work: it was a recipe for a severely divided society; the Hawaiians would stand still while *haole* society (and the Chinese and Japanese) raced ahead. The Hawaiian commoners themselves recognized this as early as 1845 when—as cited in the earlier quoted petitions they sent to their king—they pleaded against allowing foreigners taking the oath of allegiance on the ground that "we are not prepared to compete with foreigners, we shall immediately be overcome.... we shall become the servants of foreigners." They knew that they would fall behind, and indeed that is what happened. This was bound to cause friction.

In their petition of 1845, the Hawaiian petitioners requested more time, reasoning, "If the introduction of foreigners into this kingdom could be deferred for ten years perhaps, and we could have places given us suitable for cultivation and pasturing cattle, ... by that time ... it might be proper to introduce foreigners." In fact, the Great Māhele having been largely completed in 1855, they did have their ten more years; but it was clearly not enough. We turn next to this question of time.

Cultural change takes time... time a culture may not have

Courtney Rountree Mills was asked—given her experience since 2010 in Kenya, where her organization Sinapis has accelerated 1,500 early stage companies³¹—what success her organization had seen in introducing subsistence-based societies to more market-oriented approaches. She responded:

Unfortunately, the only successes I have seen on that front is when you provide skills training for basic jobs (e.g. domestic house lady, security guard, etc.) and then connect them with job opportunities. Most of them are not prepared to be entrepreneurs because their life is too fragile to deal with the natural ups and downs that accompany entrepreneurship. What they need most is a steady job to help them save and be prepared for life's emergencies and also for that employer to provide small salary-based loans to help them put their children in school and afford health care bills. Once their kids receive a better education, they then move up

²⁷ C.S. Lewis, *Abolition of Man* (New York: HarperOne, 1974), 27.

²⁸ "Concerning Foreigners Taking the Oath of Allegiance," translated from the Elele, *The Friend*, Aug. 1, 1845:119. ²⁹ "Concerning Foreigners" 1845:119.

³⁰ "... to 1855, when the 'Great Māhele' ... was completed." (S. La Croix & J. Roumasset, "The Evolution of Private Property in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii," *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 50, no. 4 (Dec. 1990), 829-852, 831).

³¹ See "A Call to Startups to Start Making Disciples," at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goMt57CE2kI&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR378_uS-PeyktBYRNsGVwQUAnarjhhdVEB-HUbLFX4W4gARgimnvIi4S58, 4:38 minute mark forward.

a bit in the world and their children do the same and then within about 3 generations the family can move totally out of poverty. That's really what I have seen work.³²

But part of the tragedy of Hawaii is that it did not have the luxury of time. It could not wait for the three generations necessary for cultural change given the Hawaiian leaders' commitment—as explained in the section "The Necessary Foreign Connection" further above—already by 1820 to the power and wealth made available to them by western trade.

Not only that, but with Hawaii's plummeting population, the tax revenues provided by native Hawaiians' meager business revenues were simply insufficient to provide for government expenditures.³³ The King and his government had to find the money to fund the government, and the only realistic possibility was encouraging the foreign community in its trade business: until the late 1820s this meant pursuing the sandalwood trade (in western ships to China); then, until c. 1860, this meant supplying the New England whalers plying the Pacific; finally, from 1860 onwards (after the whaling trade was dying), sugar was the key. Sugar especially limited native Hawaiian involvement, with its demand for high levels of capital investment and equally high levels of technical expertise, only available to those with close connections to the industrial developments in America and Europe. Native Hawaiians simply did not have the time to catch up.

Despite native Hawaiians' handicap in sugar production, Hawaii's government—both the *haole*s and its native Hawaiians—supported and backed it as necessary to the country's prosperity. When King Kalākaua came to the throne in 1874 he proclaimed his top two objectives to be "The increase of the people; the advancement of agriculture and commerce; these are the objects which my Government will mainly strive to accomplish." A chief instrument of his second object was crafting a Reciprocity Treaty with the United States whose central objective was reducing US tariffs on Hawaiian sugar. In a farewell address at Kawaiahao Church, prior to his 1881 world tour the king made clear his support for such a treaty benefitting sugar:

To-day, our country needs the aid of a Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity with America in order to ensure our material prosperity, and I believe that if such a Treaty can be secured, the beneficial effects will be soon apparent to all classes, and our nation, under its reviving influences, will grow again.³⁶

The Hawaiian government not only supported sugar for Hawaii, but suggested its introduction to other Polynesian nations. So, when King Kalākaua's sent Bush and Poor—hapa-haoles (half whites) who favored Kalākaua's nativist policies—to Samoa to further his grand plans for a

³² Courtney Rountree Mills, email message to author, May 29, 2019.

³³ La Croix and Roumasset 1990:847-851.

³⁴ Pacific Commercial Advertiser, April 18, 1874, cited in R. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom: 1874-1893, The Kalākaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 13, 17.

³⁵ Reports such as Tiffany Ing's give a mis-impression when they write: "... in 1874 Politically, haole politicians had gained greater influence in the Legislature, and as a way of trying to satisfy them, Kalākaua negotiated the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, which ... shifted resources and power from himself to the sugar businessmen...." (T. Ing, "To Be or Not to Be: A Rhetorical Study of Kalākaua's *Legends and Myths of Hawaii: The Fables and Folk-Lore of a Strange People*," M.A. Project, English Department, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 23 April 2003:3). Firstly, in 1874, "only two *haoles* were elected to the house of representatives" (Kuykendall 1967:248); hardly a recipe for "greater influence." Secondly, while King Kalākaua was indeed strongly opposed to any article within a Reciprocity Treaty granting rights to Pearl Harbor to the United States, as to the Reciprocity Treaty itself, he was strongly in favor. (See Kuykendall 1967:395; Wodehouse to FO, no. 34, Nov. 18, 1887, BPRO, FO 58/220 (cited in Kuykendall 1967:397))

³⁶ Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 11/21/1874, p. 2; cited "King Kalākaua's address in English, 1874. Available at: https://nupepa-hawaii.com/2014/11/16/king-Kalākauas-address-in-english-1874/

Polynesia alliance, Bush and Poor advocated sugar as a solution to cash flow. Cook's PhD dissertation points this out:

This [the suggested improvements] meant that Sāmoa would have to seriously accelerate its cash flow, necessitating major agricultural development, likely following the same plantation model the Germans were pursuing in Sāmoa and various factions were pursuing in Hawai'i.... Seeing their own "progress" to be largely an effect of the agricultural industrialization of Hawai'i, the Hawaiians also intended to increase commercial development in Samoan agriculture and turn Sāmoa towards a cash economy.³⁷

The sugar economy, with all its technical demands, was racing ahead, whether or not native Hawaiians could keep pace with it.

To succeed, business training must take the right approach with the right people; beware set presuppositions preventing one from grasping this

This next lesson arises out of the suspicion that despite all the fine training programs the missionaries did initiate (as detailed in Part One), their business training was seriously deficient at two points: both in whom they sought to train and in how they sought to train them. Furthermore, the missionaries' programmatic deficiencies on these two points seem to have been rooted in their own deficiencies of outlook—specifically, an unwillingness to question their own prejudices. These prejudices were not racial but cultural—first, an unquestioning adherence to their own western educational model and, second, their personal anti-monarchical, pro-republican sociopolitical sentiments.

The missionaries had three basic strategies for helping the Hawaiians achieve increasing economic well-being: preaching, teaching, and a private ownership-public policy. Conversion-oriented preaching of the Gospel was the first step; getting one's heart right with God. The heart was then to be joined with the mind through regular teaching—teaching not only on the fundamentals of the Christian life but also in more holistic subjects. Reading, writing, health matters, agriculture, all was approached with the purpose of up-skilling the Hawaiians. Lastly, the missionaries eventually pushed for—and with the Mahele were successful in—governmental-level public policy change. They expected that this public policy, in which individuals were given legally-rooted personal ownership interests thus enabling them to more securely enjoy the fruits of their labor, would give the necessary incentive and impetus to ever-increasing Hawaiian business development. These expectations were disappointed.³⁸ Over the decades the Hawaiians fell further and further behind economically.

As educators, these disappointments should have caused the missionaries to pause and re-examine their basic assumptions and approaches. They didn't. Ted Ward, ³⁹ respected education specialist, writes on the important role of "evaluation" in education:

Evaluation ... focuses either on the learner or on the program.... And of course, those of us who are very committed to people say, well, let's put the emphasis on the learner. Personally, I think that's the wrong place to put it. The program is the primary thing to be evaluated, not the people. The people are real already. The

³⁷ Cook 2011:256, 268-69

³⁸ Part One details the disappointed expectations of the early Hawaiian chiefs and missionaries.

³⁹ Ward served as professor of education at Michigan State University for thirty years before moving on Trinity Evangelical Divinity School as Professor of Christian Education and Mission for nine years. With a decided interest in cross-cultural and missional education he took on roles such as Research Specialist in Ethnographic Studies, Institute for International Studies in Education; Coordinator, Nonformal Education in Indonesia and Brazil (research and development project), 1974-1978. (See "About Ted," The Ward Archives, accessed September 17, 2019. Available at http://www.wardarchives.org/sample-page/)

issue is what is the program doing to people.... The program is assumed to be right or as good as it can be or as good as it needs to be already. So when you say, we're going to give tests in our school and we're going to measure to see how people are doing. Notice the phrase, see how people are doing. Not, see how the program is doing; see if the program is helping people, but see how people are doing as if somehow the program is beyond measurement, beyond judgment, beyond concern.... Now I submit to you that in nonformal education our primary focus of evaluation should be to raise questions about the program. 40

The missionaries never seemed to have questioned their basic educational approach to the Hawaiians. That is not to say they were not to any degree "experimental" in their approach, ⁴¹ but simply not sufficiently so. They did teach industrial and agricultural skills in their special boarding schools, but it was always in a formal, classroom setting. 42 In teaching business skills, they never seriously engaged in teaching-by-doing. They never actually engaged in joint business ventures with their Hawaiian colleagues, whereby shoulder-to-shoulder they could teach business skills and practice. The Hawaiians were simply given some skills and then left to their own devices as to how to then apply them in starting businesses.⁴³ At this point their teaching program was deficient. Skills are one thing; using them to start a business another.

The missionaries were not only deficient in their teaching program and approach; they were equally deficient in their choice of students. On the one hand, they admirably sought to equip the whole nation. The commoners were not to be neglected. All to the good; but turning again to Courtney Rowntree Mills, relevant to this point, she observes in a recent piece:

Sometimes helping the poor can mean not working directly with the poor.... The very poor are sometimes not able to be successful entrepreneurs themselves. Their life situation is too fragile to take on the lack of security that goes hand in hand with entrepreneurship.... [Rather, by] helping ... local middle class, educated entrepreneurs[, n]ew businesses were being created [which then produced jobs for the poor]. 44

The missionaries focused their education on the mass of the people. They wanted to see the whole population equipped and raised up. 45 That is well and good, but using Courtney Rowntree Mills'

⁴⁰ Ted Ward, "Evaluation in Nonformal Education," *The Ward Archives*, accessed September 17, 2019. Available at: http://www.wardarchives.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Evaluation-in-Nonformal-Education-1981.pdf .

⁴¹ Carl Beyer, "Manual and Industrial Education for Hawaiians During the 19th Century," The Hawaiian Journal of History, vol. 38 (2004):8-9. The great majority of them were university graduates, at a time when even in the mainland United States only a tiny percentage graduated from college.

⁴² The ABCFM missionaries placed great value, for Christian ministers, the "a liberal education" (i.e. university level education). The great majority of them were university graduates, at a time when even in the mainland United States only a tiny percentage graduated from college (see H. Bingham, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands: Of the Civil, Religious, and Political History of Those Islands (Rutland, VT: Tuttle Publishing, Kindle Edition, 2011), loc. 3638, 3650-3663). (see Census Office, The Statistics of the Population of the United States; Ninth Census-Volume I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872), Table I; Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (1976) series H 752, 757, 761; Statistical Abstract: 2012 (2011) table 300.)

⁴³ This is not to say that in the early decades there were no joint business ventures at all between missionaries and Hawaiians. Kuykendall reports that there were several sugar plantation-with-mills on Maui and Kauai jointly developed between missionaries and Hawaiians in the late 1830s and early 1840s (see R. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom: 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1938), 179-182). But these were eventually abandoned and never engaged as a serious, on-going teaching tool complementing the more formal, classroom approach the missionaries were devoted to.

⁴⁴ Courtney Rountree Mills, "10 Lessons from over 1,000 Kingdom Entrepreneurs in Africa and Beyond," Faith in Business Quarterly, vol. 20.1: 27 to 34. Available at: https://www.faith-in-business.org/2019/11/10-lessons/ ⁴⁵ Beyer writes, "Between 1824 and 1827, nearly the entire adult population of the Hawaiian Islands went to school. This missionary educational system reached the peak of its development in 1832, when more than 53,000 pupils were enrolled in 900 schools...." (Beyer Journal 2004:8)

hard-won insight above, one wonders if they missed something here. Even their elite educational facility, the Lahainaluna High School (which, for reasons of cost, was transferred to the government in 1846⁴⁶) did not really reach the higher chiefs and ali'i. We read of Lahainaluna's students:

They were also for the most part *kaukau ali'i*, a class of Hawaiians who were used to serving and following the orders of the *ali'i nui* (high chiefs). When the *ali'i nui* wanted the *palapala* to be successful, they ordered their servers to go to Lahainaluna to learn.⁴⁷

But were these the right sort of trainees? For entrepreneurial businesses, does one not need leaders accustomed not so much to "following" orders as to "giving" them? This would entail engaging the higher ranked ali'i, and not simply those of a lower rank. The Hawaiian aristocracy, like most aristocracies, consisted of a hierarchy of ranks with different levels of honor and power. After the supreme ruler, the mō'ī, came three different ranks of ali'i:

the *ali'i nui* were the high-ranking chiefs that governed an island.... The *ali'i nui* were in charge of overseeing the *ali'i 'ai moku*. The *ali'i 'ai moku* were chiefs of the different *moku* or districts.... Under the *ali'i 'ai moku* were lesser chiefs known as *kaukauali'i*.⁴⁸

It seems that only a few of the higher chiefs were included in the missionaries' formal educational focus when it came to business (this excludes, of course, the Royal School, which was far smaller, with 16 students in its ten year life⁴⁹). This may have been a serious mistake.⁵⁰

There are indications that this omission of training the higher ali'i was not purely accidental; that it was rooted rather in the anti-monarchical, pro-republican sentiments of the missionaries, sentiments inherited from their American homeland. After all, all the ABCFM missionaries were American; it was not for nothing that ABCFM stood for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. This sometimes startling anti-monarchical republicanism pops up clearly through the decades.

We see it in Dr. Gerrit Judd's worried letter in 1839 reporting to the ABCFM on the missionaries' annual gathering, just then attended by 32 new missionaries recently arriving from the United States at a time, Judd points out, when it was "boiling with agitation over the question of slavery."

⁴⁸ "Ali'i," *Living Hawaiian Culture: Kumukahi* (A division of Kamehameha Schools), accessed September 17, 2019. Available at http://www.kumukahi.org/units/na-kanaka/kaiaulu/alii

The older *Ali'i Nui* in particular had been instructed at length by Richards on the intricacies of capitalism and the younger *Ali'i Nui* were well trained by Amos Cooke at the Chiefs' Children's School in the basics of accounting and business.94 Yet none of these *Ali'i Nui* made terribly good businessmen. The post-*Māhele* careers of the ten highest *Ali'i Nui* of the 1848 *Māhele* provide a telling glimpse of *Ali'i Nui* business acumen. In forty years time most of the *Ali'i Nui 'Āina* had passed into foreign control by the mystifying Western transactions of probate, mortgage default, and foreign trustee management of large estates.... Kauikeaouli [Kamehameha III] and his successor, Alexander Liholiho [Kamehameha IV], sold or mortgaged so many of these '*Āina* that in 1865, legislation was passed to make the Crown Lands inalienable [taking them, effectively, out from under the control of Hawaii's sovereign]. (Kame'eleihiwa 2012:loc. 5406-5418, 5502)

It could be argued, of course, that once again the problem here was that the sort of training they were given was inadequate, that it was too theoretical rather than hands-on in partnership with those more experienced.

⁴⁶ Even as a governmentally-run public school it continued to train up missionaries and ministers in addition to its broader educational mandate (see Beyer *Journal* 2004:11-2)

⁴⁷ Beyer *Journal* 2004:10.

⁴⁹ Carl Beyer, "Manual and Industrial Education during Hawaiian Sovereignty: Curriculum in the Transculturation of Hawaii" (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2004), 95.

⁵⁰ That said, Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa's comments regarding the higher chiefs' business failures—despite having who been "instructed at length" in some of the new business ways—are not encouraging, when she writes:

Alarmed, Judd writes that these new arrivals viewed Hawai'i's undemocratic governance as akin to slavery, and in response were "advocating the principle that chiefs who were members of the church and would not resign their office should be excommunicated, as while in that office they necessarily support oppression." Furthermore, at the same annual gathering, when it was suggested that teachers be assigned to educate the chiefs, this "measure was opposed on the ground that we ought not to do anything to sustain the present system of hereditary government," Judd then adding, "One observed that he had serious doubts whether it was proper for us to educate any class of men for chiefs." ⁵¹

Even Judd, despite his—on strategic grounds—largely pro-monarchical stance,⁵² himself in 1835 wrote of his reservations regarding the chiefs:

The miserable policy of the chiefs, is to monopolize all the talent ... for the purpose of maintaining their own power.... Almost all the teachers of worth, on whom the labors of this station have been expended, are kept by Kina'u constantly about her person."53

We see this anti-monarchical stance in John L. Emerson, missionary pioneer on Oahu from 1832-1867, who wrote in 1833 to his colleague Levi Chamberlain of the king's party then touring through his region, "They go now like a company of locusts and eat all before them & leave the land behind them *pilau loa* [stinking rotten]. It is trying to republican nerves." ⁵⁴

And we see this republicanism much later among the missionary descendants, such that it was said of Sanford Dole (1844-1926), son of Hawaiian missionaries Daniel and Emily Dole:

Sanford's intense hatred for Kamehameha V [r. 1863-1872] was not based on Hawaiian "revolutionary government" alone but was fed by his Maine relatives, who hated all royalty. They felt their forefathers had given their blood for freedom from British royalty. Their dislike was intense, almost fanatical, against all royalty. ⁵⁵

This instinctive aversion to monarchical and aristocratic rule may have well blinded the missionaries to the fact that it was precisely this class that might have been the best candidates for business training. These Hawaiian aristocrats were used to decision-making and to handling wealth and power; they had credibility with the wider population; they had the resources, at least for the first decades of the nineteenth century, to invest in business. If any businesses were to be started, it would have been far more likely through these ali'i than with any other class of Hawaiians. And yet they were overlooked by the missionaries. Perhaps had they not been overlooked, the business development of Hawaii might have gone differently.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Gerrit Judd's unsent letter of Sept. 12, 1839, Bishop Museum, Judd Family Papers Finding Aid), Box 70, 5.1.29.

⁵² R.C. Wyllie wrote a letter of 1845 pointing out: "Mr. Judd fears a growing tendency to Republicanism, which he believes to be incompatible with the welfare of the Islands, and which he considers it his duty to the King to resist." (Kuykendall 1938:240)

⁵³ Gerrit Judd to R. Anderson, draft of October 8, 1835 letter, in HMCS Library (quoted in Kuykendall 1938:112).

⁵⁴ Kirch and Sahlins 1992:146 (citing MsL: Emerson 18 Sept 1833).

⁵⁵ Helena Allen, *Sanford Ballard Dole: Hawaii's Only President, 1844-1926*, (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1988), 49-50.

⁵⁶ Having noted the possible failures in the missionaries' training approach—too theoretical and focused on the wrong group (i.e. not on the higher chiefs)—a caveat should be added. That is, when they the missionaries first began their business training of Hawaiians, they *did* embrace both these principles. This is clear from the work of William Richards, the missionary (ex-missionary, as he was required to step down from the mission in order to take up this secular work). Selected in 1838 by the Hawaiian missionaries, in consultation with the king and chiefs, to teach Hawaiians "political economy" (i.e. both in matters of politics and economics), Richards both a) focused his training on the higher chiefs (*ali'i*) and b) saw the need for practical, hands-on experience.

The lesson for us today when attempting to create business initiatives cross-culturally is three-fold: we must look carefully at the appropriateness of our teaching programs and approaches; we must ensure that we are actually looking to train the right sort of people; and thirdly, we must beware our own prejudices and set assumptions which could blind us from fairly assessing these.

Priorities differ—without mutual respect, war results

The next lesson is that "priorities will differ" when an outside culture introduces its business practices into a foreign, host culture. What is an "of course" for one culture is not always so for another. That clash between native Hawaiians and the foreign business class can be seen in the Honolulu's *Saturday Press* article of 1880 when, responding to Native Hawaiian's complaint of insufficient Hawaiians in the cabinet, the article stated:

Let us not be misunderstood. It is not a question of race, but of fitness. Let a Hawaiian (of Polynesian race), appear who can manage an ordinary house of business.... When such a man can be found, he may probably be qualified to manage ... the business of ... the nation. Let the native qualify himself for high office and we shall rejoice to see him a real ruler in his native land.⁵⁷

Race was not the issue, but cultural values were. "Business efficiency"—was the clear priority driving this *Saturday Press*, a *haole* newspaper, article. ⁵⁸ That is, the writers were perfectly happy to have Hawaiians in political leadership—as confirmed by the previous sixty years' events—*as long as* business efficiency was upheld. So Hawaiian leadership was valued, but only secondarily. Native Hawaiians, on the other, while also valuing business efficiency, reverse the priorities. For them, maintaining Hawaiian leadership was absolutely central and could not be sacrificed. Their

This is clear from Richards' correspondence. In it reports that it was the "king & chiefs" who were his students, with Thomas Woods pointing out, "It is clear that Richards envisioned the *ali'i* as the leading entrepreneurs and facilitators of a new Hawaiian economy." Moreover, these lessons were not purely theoretical. Richards wrote the mission business agent requesting practical advice along the lines of, "What are the great obstacles or the principal obstacles in the way of chiefs taking up a quantity of land and engaging extensively in the manufacture of sugar?" Richards was clear on the importance of hands-on learning, writing, "Must not such business be taught or learned by experience, even though they might be exposed to losses at the commencement?" (Thomas A. Woods, "No Ke Kalaiaina and William Richards's Seminar for the *Ali'i*: A Major Catalyst for Mid-Nineteenth-Century Change in Hawai'i," Hawaiian Mission Houses Research Project (2018), 18-19. Available at: https://hmha.missionhouses.org/files/original/7d48112f685917c6d925e2adf9eb5db2.pdf)

Why this approach—focusing business training on the higher *ali'i* with opportunity to be involved in hands-on, practical business ventures—was not continued after Richards is unclear. Did the chiefs show themselves, after decades, simply unable to successfully engage in business? If so, why? Or was it because the "sons of the mission," who themselves took up business ventures from the 1850s onwards, were so much in "survival mode" with their fledgling business ventures that they felt they could not afford to take on untried partners, partners who might be a drag on their own survival? Or was it rather that these "sons of the mission" had lost their forefathers' vision for the equipping of native Hawaiian leaders for business? This question demands further research.

⁵⁷ Re. *Saturday Press* of October 9, 1880. Available at https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82014681/1880-10-09/ed-1/seq-2/

⁵⁸ See H. Chapin, "Newspapers of Hawai'i 1834 to 1903: From 'He Liona' to the Pacific Cable," *The Hawaiian Journal of History*, vol. 18 (1984):47-86, 57-58, 68. Business efficiency implied parsimonious saving, not spending for today in order to invest for tomorrow. This notion ran headlong into notions of Hawaiian *mana*, a basic driver in Hawaiian society. Sahlins records the efforts of 19th century missionary to Hawaii, John Emerson, to teach business efficiency to his Hawaiian parishioners and concludes:

For all his trouble, however, Emerson failed to wean the people from Hawaiian values of beauty and glory.... ... [T]he missionaries were now confronted with just that: a popular display of *mana* – in forms that had originally and uniquely marked the consumption pattern of the Polynesian *ali'i....* [Emerson observing:] Many will go without food and live in miserable hovels, in order to be able to purchase silks and other expensive articles. (Kirch and Sahlins 1992:164-166)

refrain of "Hawaii for Hawaiians" in repeated election cycles made this clear.⁵⁹ They cared less for the business reasons behind the Bayonet Constitution; they cared more that their native monarch, King Kalākaua, had been severely hobbled. And then again, it was for the same reason that native Hawaiians overwhelmingly supported Queen Liliuokalani's attempt to dismiss the Bayonet Constitution and reassert her royal power.⁶⁰

This support for the queen by Hawaiians need not be seen as racism in reverse. It was the cultural values—carried by their race, naturally—wrapped up in the monarchy which were at stake. Hawaiian-ness had for centuries meant an awe-filled respect for, first their chiefs, and then, ultimately, their monarchy. It was an integral part of the very structure of their society; it was part of "who they were." If "business efficiency" was a high cultural value for the business community, then support for the monarchy was a high cultural value for the native Hawaiians. As such, it deserved to be respected and valued by the very business community which so often clashed with the monarchy.

The only hope for a possible peaceful resolution was if both sides could see their way to valuing the priorities of the other. On the one hand, hotheads like Lorrin Thurston could have given more room to Hawaiians' deep-felt loyalty to and value for their monarchy. Instead of instantly displacing Queen Lili'uokalani with their provisional government, they could have instead worked with her more cooperatively. Such indeed was, initially, the course advocated by moderates such as Sanford Dole (but who subsequently accepted the presidency of the provisional government) and G.N. Wilcox.⁶² The problem was that by 1893 the level of mutual mistrust was such, that counsels of moderation were largely disfavored.

 $https://books.google.com/books?id=ko03AQAAIAAJ\&pg=PA363\&lpg=PA363\&dq=Senate+Report+No.+227,+\\ "Hawaiian+Islands,"+February+26,+1894,+Fifty-PA363\&lpg=PA363$

⁵⁹ Kuvkendall 1967:517.

⁶⁰ Ronald Williams admits there was some support in 1895 amongst native Hawaiians for the Provisional Government and for annexation to the United States but contrasts this with the "great mass of Native Hawaiians who vehemently supported the continued independence of their nation and the return of their Queen." (Williams 2013:225)

⁶¹ Kame'eleihiwa 2012:loc. 971-1004; Osorio 2002:25, 38, 251. Valuing a person's culture is part of valuing the person. To value the Hawaiians was to value the Hawaiian. The disciplines of sociology and anthropology are based on the assumption that understanding or valuing people as individuals is impossible without understanding and valuing their larger cultural context; that a person's identity is to one degree or another embedded in their culture. There is huge debate—which is outside this paper's purview—within these disciplines as to the extent to which an underlying "human nature" explains human activity as over against their local culture, but most realize the importance of both. (See M. Sahlins, *Apologies to Thucydides: Understanding History as Culture and Vice Versa* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2004), 1, 3, 16, 118-120; Agustín Fuentes et al., "On Nature and the Human," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 112, Issue 4 (2010):512-521.

^{62 &}quot;Dole resigned from the Hawaiian League after the radicals ... began pushing to overthrow the monarchy [of King Kalākaua]," (J. Siler, Lost Kingdom: Hawaii's Last Queen, the Sugar Kings, and America's First Imperial Adventure (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012), 141) and when the Committee of Safety first proposed, in response to Queen Liliuokalani's publicizing (January 14, 1893) her new constitution, a provisional government, "Dole quietly stated that he was not prepared to take part in the movement...." (Kuykendall 1967:589)(citing Blount's Report, p. 497 (W. O. Smith's statement)) G.N. Wilcox, who served in the queen's cabinet, right up until the end, until her introduction on Saturday, January 14, of the new constitution, reported: "Up to that time I had, to the best of my ability, tried to sustain and support the Hawaiian monarchy, and especially in the interests of the Hawaiians to keep a clean and honest Government,' then adding, "it was not until that Saturday that I felt that the monarchy was no longer practicable...." ("The Morgan Report," Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Report No. 227, "Hawaiian Islands," February 26, 1894, Fifty-Third Congress, Second Session, pp. 360-1169, 813. Available at

The native Hawaiians also made mistakes here. Rather than dismissing so easily the business community's—largely *haole*—concerns with economic efficiency as "anti-Hawaiian" or purely self-interested, they could have embraced it as something their country needed. Hawaiian leadership should have resisted the too-easy strategy (advocated by Moreno and Gibson, both, ironically, *haoles* themselves) of playing the racial card of "Hawaii for Hawaiians." This racial card poked its head up everywhere from the 1880s onwards, exploding into the very "identity politics" so bedeviling Hawaii today. 63

"Who is a Hawaiian?" was the question Hawaii's *Saturday Press* of October 9, 1880 asked, in response to the commonly-voiced criticism then heard in Hawaii that "Hawaiians are not properly represented in the Ministry." The Saturday Press countered this complaint by challenging its underlying assumption: that race and ethnicity was the true basis of Hawaiian-ness. It argued instead that a *haole* could be "thoroughly Hawaiian ... by birth, though not by descent, by education, sympathies, early association, and subsequent career." Thus it argued two sorts of Hawaiians, both valid: "foreign descended Hawaiians" and "purely native descended Hawaiians"

Similarly, a week earlier A. F. Judd, then an Associate Justice of the Hawaiian Supreme Court had argued on the same theme:

A wrong impression has obtained that only those born here of the aboriginal Hawaiian stock are true Hawaiians. A man born here of white parents who spends his talents and energies for the benefit of Hawaii is as true a Hawaiian as if his parents were all red, or one red and the other white. Those who benefit this country by their good character and example and life are the true Hawaiians.⁶⁵

The real problem driving the "Hawaii for Hawaiians" campaign was not that "true Hawaiians" had been displaced by "false Hawaiians" or non-Hawaiians, but that mutual respect and trust had broken down between the two groups of Hawaiians: between, to use the *Saturday Press'* terms, foreign-descended Hawaiians and purely native-descended Hawaiians. Without respect, conflict was bound to replace collaboration.

Undoubtedly the economic context added to the potential for disrespect and conflict. Conflict could easily arise given the bare economic and population facts: the *haole* business community held most of the wealth; the Hawaiian population was both poorer and shrinking so drastically such that the 1890 census "was the first in which immigrants and island-born nonnatives (49,368) finally outnumbered the surviving native Hawaiians, including those of mixed race (40,662)."⁶⁶ Hawaiians were fast losing power, while the *haoles* gained it. Only mutual respect and trust could overcome these frictions, and this was fast failing for a variety of reasons.

From the *haole* side an important contributor to this lack of respect and trust was the false value they placed on the concept of "civilization," their understanding of which too often led them to

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 $Third+Congress, +Second+Session\&source=bl\&ots=s63jwBr2Nf\&sig=ACfU3U38L3F_BEQ3zJ250V4uUcb2DnUtyQ\&hl=en\&sa=X\&ved=2ahUKEwjP6seyscXlAhVqHzQIHUaHB30Q6AEwAXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=no%20longer%20practicable\&f=false)$

⁶³ By "bedeviling," I mean identity politics tendency toward splitting up society into ever smaller groups and, instead of seeking what is common between those groups, pitting one group's rights against another.

⁶⁴ Re. *Saturday Press* of October 9, 1880. Available at https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82014681/1880-10-09/ed-1/seq-2/

⁶⁵ Saturday Press, Oct. 2, 1880, p. 3. Available at: https://www.newspapers.com/image/49988719

⁶⁶ Haley 2014:loc. 4982

dismiss the Hawaiians as "uncivilized." Another contributor, as noted above, was the *haole* side's elevating of "business efficiency" to the point where it completely sidelined native Hawaiians' traditional love for the monarchy. Unsurprisingly, the Hawaiians on the receiving end of such attitudes, were not likely to reciprocate with trust.

From the Hawaiian side, a chief contributor to the growing mistrust was the character of King Kalākaua. It contributed, and fatally so, to the increasingly stuttering relationship between the two parties in Hawaii. We turn to this factor next.

Persons & Character Key in the end

The last lesson to be drawn from the Hawaii's 19th century is that people matter! People with their personalities, peculiarities, and character can make or break a situation. All the wise principles and policies may be in place, but what people do with them is decisive. If Lorrin Thurston had been less of a hothead, perhaps the *haole* community would have reacted differently to Queen Liliuokalani's overthrow of the constitution of 1889. If King Kalākaua had had a more stable character, one not so attracted to the charismatic charms of Celso Moreno or Walter Gibson with their fantastic schemes, or to the easy money offers of a Claus Spreckels,⁶⁸ events might have unfolded very differently.

It was not that King Kalākaua was without intelligence and ability. He had both in good measure. His Attorney General, Williams Nevins Armstrong, accompanying the king on his world tour, described his visit to Queen Victoria, in glowing words: "the many persons who have met His Majesty, since His arrival here, express themselves as highly pleased with His Majesty's appearance, bearing, and intelligence..."

And Lorrin Thurston's own memoirs note Kalākaua's abilities. He writes:

Perhaps his charm is best indicated by the words of an educated woman who came to the islands as a governess in Kalākaua's reign. She once told me that Kalākaua, to her, was one of the most fascinating men she had ever met. She elucidated: "Whenever I attend a public reception, or meeting of any kind, at which the King is present, I simply tag around after him, feasting my eyes on him and his actions. He is so unaffected, kindly, and genial in his conduct and association with all classes; he has such a manner of kingly dignity about him, and at the same time is so jovially companionable, with that hail-fellow-well-met air, and so appreciative of his listeners, that he appears to me almost an ideal man. I cannot conceive that he is guilty of the many things alleged against him."

As a matter of fact, it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the truth of the good things said of Kalākaua by the present royal propagandists.⁷⁰

Remarkably, Thurston admits here that the good things said of the king are completely true.

Tiffany Lani Ing sets about attempting to resurrect the Hawaiian king's reputation in her book *Reclaiming Kalākaua*, premised on the argument that "The *mō* 'ī [king] struck many, and above all his own people, as an intelligent, eloquent, compassionate, and effective Hawaiian leader." But Ing misses the point; all the qualities she enumerates Thurston equally admitted. It was not his

⁶⁷ The reader is referred to the Spring 2020 edition of *Spiritus: ORU Journal of Theology* journal where will be found a fuller discussion of this very point.

⁶⁸ Kuykendall 1967:591-592.

⁶⁹ Armstrong to Green, July 12, 1881, cited in Kuykendall 1967:233.

⁷⁰ L. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution* (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co., 1936), 21-22.

⁷¹ "About the Book," University of Hawaii Press. Available at: https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/title/reclaiming-Kalākaua-nineteenth-century-perspectives-on-a-hawaiian-sovereign/

positive qualities that were in question; it was his weaknesses which compromised and trumped these qualities. Thus Thurston, having admitted the king's abilities, then added, "The only explanation of the paradox is that Kalākaua was a remarkable incarnation of the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde ... [given] the debasing influences of Kalākaua's conduct." The problem was not King Kalākaua's undeniable good qualities; the problem was the fatal flaws that undid them.

Even defenders of the Hawaiian monarchy and critics of the overthrow admit his glaring weaknesses. So, Jonathan Osorio, that champion of traditional Hawaii, writes, "The king [Kalākaua], more of whose palpable weaknesses, political and personal, were exposed the longer he reigned, could never adequately represent either kānaka [native Hawaiian] or *haole* without alienating one or the other."

Helena Allen notes Kalākaua's weakness for overspending, "Between these two men, Kalākaua's impulsive urge to lavish the wealth of the royal treasury was exploited and flattered.... Gibson ... supported the weakest side of Kalākaua – the vainglorious desire to be the Napoleon of the Pacific...."⁷⁴

Gavan Daws, an Australian and the first person (1960) to enroll in the University of Hawaii's new doctoral program to study Hawaiian history, 75 observes:

Most of the productive land of the islands was in the hands of white men, and the sugar_industry was virtually the sole support of the kingdom, and yet good business sense did not seem to be able to get a hearing at the royal court. The planters and businessmen kept reminding Kalākaua how much he owed them, but most of the time he did not seem to be listening.⁷⁶

"Good business sense" simply could not get a listening from Kalākaua, as even the sympathetic Daws admits. This was foolish. Kalākaua was digging his own grave as he progressively alienated the business community. For this reason Daws goes on to conclude, "It would be convenient for the League to be able to say that Kalākaua and Gibson brought their downfall on themselves, and in a sense they did."⁷⁷

Politically, in the short term, King Kalākaua thought he could ignore his own business community. As the English Commissioner Wodehouse wrote at the time, one year before the Bayonet Constitution: "The Commercial City of Honolulu as such, is wholly unrepresented in this, as it was in the last Legislature." It was his unconstrained dreams of glory and grandeur, complemented by an arrogance that dismissed and made him deaf towards his business partners in

⁷² Thurston 1936:22.

⁷³ Osorio 2002:147

⁷⁴ Allen 1982:152-3, 173.

To "Long Story Short with Leslie Wilcox," PBS Hawai'i," June 10, 2008. Available at: https://www.pbshawaii.org/long-story-short-with-leslie-wilcox-gavan-daws/; "About Us/Our History," University of Hawai'i and Mānoa, Department of History. Available at: https://manoa.hawaii.edu/history/about/our-history/
 G. Daws, Shoal Of Time: A History Of The Hawaiian Islands (Amazon Digital Services, Kindle Publication [original publication 1968] 2015), loc. 4677-4692.
 Daws 2015:loc. 5333-5338

⁷⁸ Kuykendall 1967:283. While the pro-fiscally restrained position cannot be identified along racial lines—with native Hawaiians Joseph Nāwahī, G. W. Pilipo, and J. W. Kalua running against the king's loose economic policies in the election of 1886—it is relevant, in understanding Commissioner Wodehouse's claim concerning the lack of haole commercial representation before the king, to see that 17 native Hawaiians were voted into the legislature versus six *haoles*. (See Kuykendall 1967:281-283)

Hawaii, this character failing was King Kalākaua's undoing. Personal character makes a difference.

Personal character was also critical concerning the next decisive step in Hawaii's downfall: the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani—and with her Hawaii's monarchy. Once again, both sides were at fault: Lorrin Thurston (as chief instigator of the *haole* insurrection and leading figure in the "Committee of Safety" response to the Queen's proclamation of a new constitution⁷⁹) for his hotheadedness and hard-heartedness in dismissing what was so precious to the Hawaiians—their monarchy. His dismissal was rooted in an Anglo-Saxon cultural arrogance⁸⁰ which devalued the native Hawaiian culture as "uncivilized," coupled with a lack of gratefulness which forgot native Hawaii's generous hospitality in opening its doors to these Anglo-Saxons in the 1820s. These were moral failures blinding Hawaii's Anglo-Saxon leaders to native Hawaiians' right to participate in the leadership of their own country. There should have been more amongst Thurston's Committee of Safety taking Judge Sanford Dole's original position in which he "quietly stated that he was not prepared to take part in the movement" to overthrow the Queen.⁸¹ He agreed she needed to be stopped, but not in this way (though Dole eventually gave way to the pressure of the others on the Committee of Safety).

Arrogance and ungratefulness were not their only serious character failings. Religious manipulation also reared its ugly head: the willingness to use religion to further one's own political agenda. That is, not content with simply disagreeing with the Queen on a political level, too many of the Anglo-Saxon religious leaders denounced the Queen, a sincere Christian, as wickedly "heathen." They justified her overthrow by positioning themselves as champions of the "Civilized Christian Party" against the "Royal Heathen party." This was deeply unfair to the Queen and to the native Hawaiians who supported her.

⁷⁹ "Throughout the period, unquestionably the most ardent and proficient propagandist on behalf of the provisional government was Lorrin A. Thurston" (Kuykendall 1967:634)

⁸⁰ In the latter half of the nineteenth century it was common for many of the European-derived (USA, Great Britain, Europe) peoples to self-identify as Anglo-Saxons, a cultural/ethnic group broader than race. See *The Friend*, April 1, 1875; "Anglo-Saxonizing Machines," *The Friend*, August 1887:63.

⁸¹ *Blount's Report*, p. 497 (W. O. Smith's statement), cited in Kuykendall 1967:588-589. Seeing that the Committee of Safety was determined to move ahead anyway, it seems Dole decided to limit the damage by then helping the Committee write up the declaration installing the provisional government.

⁸² Williams 2013:90. The Rev. O.P. Emerson, traveled from Hawaii to America to convince Americans of the justice of the overthrow by charactering "Hawaii, a Heathenizing Monarchy." He wrote "the point I make against the late dynasty—against Kalakaua and against Queen Liliuokalani—that ... they gave countenance to this heathen party.... [M]y charge is that Queen Liliuokalani followed at last the path which her brother had so plainly marked out. She gathered about her throne this corrupt heathen element." ("Hawaii, a Heathenizing Monarchy," *The Friend*, Feb. 1, 1894:10-11). The Rev. Sereno Bishop followed the same theme: "It is certain that the fatal proceedings at the palace on the 14th [the day the Queen announced the constitution which subsequently triggered the overthrow], were in some measure instigated and directed by leading kahunas, by whom the Queen had become seriously entangled. This wretched fact ... enhance[s] her disqualification. It is clear that for a Monarchy so hopelessly fallen into heathen mental and moral vileness, it only remains to be speedily buried out of sight." (*The Friend*, February 1893:13)

There should have been more amongst the Committee of Thirteen taking Judge Sanford Dole's original position in which he "quietly stated that he was not prepared to take part in the movement" to overthrow the Queen. 83 He agreed she needed to be stopped, but not in this way.

As to Queen Liliuokalani's responsibility: she was foolishly reckless in attempting to ignore and bypass an important part of her constituency: the *haole* business community. Even as they dismissed what was important to native Hawaiians, so she dismissed wholesale what was important to the business community: the 1887 constitution and the constitutional monarchy it had then set in place. As even one of her own supporters, A.S. Cleghorn, said of her downfall, "If she had followed my advice, she would have been firm on the throne, and Hawaiian Independence safe, but she has turned out a very stubborn woman and was not satisfied to Reign but wished to Rule."

Cleghorn was a Scot married to Princess Likelike, the sister of Kalākaua; he was a royalist friend and supporter of both King Kalākaua and Queen Liliuokalani; and as Governor of Oahu under Liliuokalani he protested to the American Minister Stevens his landing of 162 marines on January 16, 1893, mourning that "our independence was gone." Despite his royalist credentials, he still thought the queen had seriously erred in her judgment when announcing her new constitution. Writing to his daughter Princess Ka'iulani twelve days after the Queen's overthrow, he commented that he "was *very* angry with the trouble she had started." 86

Similarly, the queen's loyal confidante and marshal C.B. Wilson advised her against introducing the constitution, objecting to "its suitability and feasibility at that time." And this was in spite of the fact that, as he told Commissioner Blount, that he "was in sympathy with the general idea of amending the constitution by having a new one." 88

Queen Liliuokalani was a person with a strong and even imperious character. She wanted to rule and reign; she had both the temperament and the skills for it. This was her strength, but it was also her weakness. 1893 was no longer 1810 (when Kamehameha the Great united all the Hawaiian Islands under one supreme ruler). At the crucial moment—on this matter of introducing a new constitution—it seems to have been her undoing.

The Queen was also a person of great compassion, tenderly listening to the pleas of "her people"—native Hawaiians—as they implored her for a new constitution;⁸⁹ but she needed to give a listening ear to another part of her constituency as well—her business community. They were also her people. Admittedly, this was no easy task, as she could be attacked by both sides. And was. C.B. Wilson tells us that "in the beginning of her reign [she] was taunted as being too much in favor of

⁸³ *Blount's Report*, p. 497 (W. O. Smith's statement), cited in Kuykendall 1967:588-589. Seeing that the Committee of Safety was determined to move ahead anyway, it seems Dole decided to limit the damage by then helping the Committee write up the declaration installing the provisional government.

⁸⁴ Kuykendall 1967:589-90

⁸⁵ Kuykendall 1967:595-6; Siler 2012:viii.

⁸⁶ Cleghorn to Kaiulani, Jan. 28, 1893, Cleghorn Papers, AH, cited in Kuykendall 1967:592. Of course, Cleghorn had a personal interest in the preservation of the monarchy, as his daughter Princess Ka'iulani was next in the line of succession. The monarchy gone, she now had nothing, and died at the age of 24.

⁸⁷ "The Blount Report," Hawaiian Islands: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, with accompanying testimony and executive documents transmitted to Congress from January 1, 1893, to March 10, 1894 (Washington: Govt. Print Office, 1894), 1026/1834. Available at

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=miun.afj6811.0001.001&view=1up&seq=5

^{88 &}quot;The Blount Report" 1894:1035/1835.

⁸⁹ "The Blount Report" 1894:1031/1835.

and under the advice and influence of the foreigner, and against her own people and race."90 It was no easy task she had; but in the end, it was hers to do, and she seems to have made a serious mistake with serious consequences.

The personalities and character and decisions these individuals took reminds us that in pursuing "business as mission" one is reminded of the importance of people, not just principles or policies. One can attempt to set in place the soundest process and the wisest principles, but much will depend on the wisdom and character of people—people who are out of our control. We can only pray that they will have God's wisdom.

Conclusion

In reviewing the history of missions in 19th century Hawaii we have seen how "business as mission" has a two-edged quality: it can bring blessing and wholeness to a nation, but it can also bring hurt. "Business as mission," then, is no magic cure-all for mission problems. It brings its own problems. Especially is this the case when, as in Hawaii, seeking to introduce more marketoriented approaches into subsistence-based societies.

Hawaii's history reminded us that business practices invariably introduce cultural preferences, and that these preferences might clash with those of the host culture. It reminds us that cultural practices take time to change, and that one needs to assess beforehand whether one actually has the luxury of sufficient time to change. In Hawaii the answer seems to have been "no." Hawaii's history demonstrates the possible risk of introducing practices that lead to a radical two-tone society, which can set up a political tinderbox ripe for revolution, as happened in Hawaii. Learning how to prevent such a development would be key.

The lesson for today's practitioners of business as mission is clear: it is essential to prioritize learning the host's business culture. And learning demands a questioning approach. What are the pressure points where things could go wrong, both in the short term but also in the long term? What are the particular strengths to build on? How do these strengths differ from those we are familiar with? How should Christian values be incorporated into business practices when the goal is "business as mission"? Who are the key people within the culture one could access to help answer these questions? What have other business practitioners done to successfully negotiate their way? Are we reasonably certain that we are advancing kingdom values, not just our own culture's?

Missionaries and "sons of the mission" did attempt in various way to incorporate Kingdom values into business, some more successfully than others. One of the first grand attempts to see "kingdom" business" (not their term) introduced into Hawaii was by Ladd & Co. In 1841, having the confidence of the king, the chiefs, and the missionaries, they signed a contract with King Kamehameha III, in which he agreed to lease them land (eventually amounting to tens of thousands of acres) for a sugar plantation; in return, they were meant to:

stimulate and encourage in habits and industry, in all suitable ways, the native landholders dwelling in the districts in which their operation may be prosecuted, and to manufacture or purchase on fair and equitable terms the produce that may be developed by their industry, and to use their conscientious and steady endeavors to render the Sandwich Islanders an industrious, intelligent, civilized and independent nation. 91

In terms mixing paternalism with well-meaning, high intentions, the business was clearly aiming at a higher purpose than merely profit. It was this, the inclusion of God's wider purposes that won

^{90 &}quot;The Blount Report" 1894:1031/1835.

⁹¹ Kuykendall 1938:187-190.

Ladd & Co. the confidence of their hosts. Unfortunately, through credit difficulties, the enterprise failed spectacularly, such that the missionary Richard Armstrong's wife recounted her swing of emotions: "We all rejoiced to have pious, principled men come here as merchants, but O their example has been infinitely worse than the infidel, because they have disgraced our cause." 92

Other efforts were more successful at incorporating their Christianity within their business. For instance, we have already seen in Part One in this journal where Elias Bond of Kohala started a thriving sugar plantation out of a concern for his parishioners: that there were "no enterprises whatever by means of which the people could acquire desirable physical comforts." Enterprise and work was meant to provide well-being for his employees; that was his biblically-rooted vision. Moreover, concerned for their working conditions, and seeing that, "The people are treated as mere beasts of burden," he wrote to his overseers: "Above all, *flogging* must be *abandoned*. We must try to train *men*, not brutes.... This style of management *must* be abandoned." Men and women, created in the image of God, could not be treated as less. The Bible impacted his vision for work.

The Bible also impacted Sanford Dole⁹⁵—son of missionary parents and later to be president of the Hawaiian Republic—and his view of the contract labor system then being used with the Chinese coolies imported into the sugar plantations. Especially unjust, in his view, were the heavy penal sanctions imposed for breaking these years-long contracts (often five years) as well as the practice of "assigning contracts from one employer to another without the consent of the worker, as if a man were a chattel."⁹⁶ He agitated in print and in person at the Planters Society meeting against these things, saying:

I oppose the [contract labor] system from principle, because I think it is wrong; you professedly support it as a matter of necessity and individual interest.... I cannot help feeling that the chief end of this meeting, its heart and soul, is plantation profits; and the prosperity of the country, the demands of society, the future of the Hawaiian race only come in secondarily if at all, on the part of the supporters of this system... ⁹⁷

Perhaps if such a concern for biblical principles in business had been more widespread, then Hawaii's fate might have been largely different. As it was, this paper has argued that Hawaii's loss of political independence was largely set in place and triggered by the course of its economic development and the divisions that arose because of this economic development. It has argued that it was not conspiracy that brought down Hawaii but serious mistakes made by both native Hawaiians and foreign-descended Hawaiians as they went down this path.

⁹² Cited in Daws 2015:loc. 2796-2805.

⁹³ Elias Bond 1862-3 Kohala Rpt., Houghton Library, Harvard University, #1 ABC 19.1, v. 1 [304] Vol. 17, #76, (17).

⁹⁴ E. Damon, *Father Bond of Kohala: A Chronicle of a Pioneer Life in Hawaii* (Honolulu: The Friend, 1927), 186, 190-191, 196 (emphasis in the original); Elias Bond 1862-3 Kohala Rpt., Houghton Library, Harvard University, #1 ABC 19.1, v. 1 [304] Vol. 17, #76, (17).

⁹⁵ While Dole seems to have abandoned the fervent Evangelical faith of his missionary parents, he still kept a high respect for the Bible. He wrote his on Dec. 8, 1867, while a student in Boston:

I feel that I have changed much in my feelings.... New lines of thought have opened.... [T]he old beliefs which I in childhood believed ... with God's word to guide they must be examined again anew on their own merits.... I find, I think, less of sectarian differences; that I judge men not by their creeds but by their lives...... [B]e assured that in these questions I act as far as I am able conscientiously, prayerfully seeking guidance from the Bible. (Allen 1988:52-53, 55)

⁹⁶ These are Gavan Daws' words, found at Daws 2015:loc. 4008-4026.

⁹⁷ Kuykendall 1953:189.

The lessons here for today's business as mission practitioners seem clear. The economic activity we aim to introduce may bring not only benefits but tensions. Are we aware of them? Are we aware of the differing economic strata within our host society, each having possibly differing interests (some eager to accept our work, some reluctant). How will we handle these contrasting interests? And in light of the fact that cultural change takes time, are we clear as to how we will adapt the rate at which we introduce business innovations?

This study also reminds us that in times of cultural clash, only compromise and mutual understanding can prevent a war mentality from prevailing. Avoiding this war mentality is crucial, because in war one side wins and the other side loses, with something precious lost as a result. Compromise for the sake of peace is not failing. Business as mission practitioners should always seek to honor the interests of those they have come to serve. Business ought to be a win-win exchange, and as soon as it become a win-lose, it has lost its gospel character.

Finally, this study reminds us of the importance of people and character, people being the wild-card in all our best laid plans. This applies to both sides of the equation: character is important for those hoping to introduce business as mission as well as in those to whom we are wanting to go. We both—in the words of Jesus in Luke 10:5—need to be "men of peace" as well as to find the "men of peace" (so often women!) with whom to work. Seeking to be "men of peace" does not mean conflict will not occur. It will. It means being willing to take on the messiness of conflict, and not allowing it to divert our eyes from the goal—that we are here to bless others through our business, even as our God has blessed us.
