Business as Mission & Its History in 19th century Hawaii—Part One

Paul Miller
Email: paulmiller.family@comcast.net

Abstract
This paper addresses “Business as Mission” (BAM) as played out in 19th century Hawaii. History teaches us important lessons applicable to today’s world. This paper, Part One, addresses the history of business as mission in Hawaii. Part Two addresses the interpretation of this history. Part One focuses both on business as mission’s positive contributions and its negative drawbacks; it then addresses how the missionaries attempted to correct the drawbacks; finally, it sketches the three steps, from 1887 to 1898, in Hawaii’s political downfall (both its monarch and independence lost)—a downfall largely caused by “business as mission” gone awry. Business, and difficulties with its fit within wider Hawaiian society, was a chief cause of Hawaii’s political downfall. This downfall was a tragedy as it was completely contrary to the wishes of all the early (1820s on) actors—both native and foreign—who had originally embraced “business as mission” as a way to upbuild Hawaii among the nations. The mistakes made contributing to Hawaii’s loss of independence—mistakes made on both sides, both native Hawaiian and foreign-descended Hawaiian—are briefly touched upon in Part One. Part Two will explore lessons to be learned from these mistakes for Business as Mission today.

Key words: business, mission, Hawaii, ABCFM, BAM, government, history, politics, haole

“Business as mission” is a new term (1999) and a fast-multiplying concept. That said, the understanding that business development is central to Evangelical mission has long been with us. Indeed, it was central to Evangelicals’ 19th century mission to Hawaii. Fueled by the revivals of America’s Second Great Awakening (1790-1840), the Boston-based American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) landed their first missionaries on the Hawaiian Islands in 1820. From the very beginning these Hawaiian missionaries had a holistic vision beyond

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1 The meaning of “Business as Mission,” for purposes of this paper, is borrowed from the “BAM Review” which, while recognizing the existence of various, legitimate definitions, uses as their “working definition” the following: Business as Mission is profitable and sustainable businesses … [that are] intentional about Kingdom of God purpose and impact on people and nations; focused on holistic transformation and the multiple bottom lines of economic, social, environmental and spiritual outcomes; [c]oncerned about the world’s poorest and least evangelized peoples. (See Jo Plummer, “What Is Business as Mission?” The BAM Review, Jan. 14, 2015, available at: http://businessasmission.com/what-is-bam/)


just bare evangelism. Hiram Bingham, the leader of the missionary band, explained their mission goals as follows:

The object for which the missionaries felt themselves impelled to visit the Hawaiian race, was to honor God … by making them acquainted with the way of life,—to turn them … to the service and enjoyment of the living God, and adorable Redeemer,—to give them the Bible in their own tongue, … —to introduce and extend among them the more useful arts and usages of … Christianized society, and to fill the habitable parts of those important islands with schools and churches, fruitful fields, and pleasant dwellings.

Not only religious conversion but equipping in “the useful arts” was very much their purpose.

Later, in 1836, they againhammered this theme, sending back to the ABCFM an appeal for more aid in order to reach these wider holistic purposes:

The people need competent instruction in agriculture, manufactures, and the various methods of production, in order to develop the resources of the country…. They need competent instruction immediately in the science of government, in order to promote industry, to secure ample means of support, and to protect the just rights of all. They need much instruction and aid in getting into operation and extended influence those arts and usages which are adapted to the country…. 

In the same appeal, the missionaries added a darker note: a prescient warning of what would happen should the native Hawaiians not be helped to develop their resources themselves:

But foreign speculators may be expected to seize on the advantages which the country affords for agriculture, manufacture and commerce; and an inevitable flux of foreign population, induced only by the love of pleasure and gain, would doubtless hasten the waste of the aborigines; and at no distant period, the mere moldering remnants of the nation could be pointed out to the voyager.

And this warning was spot on. Business development can be a two-edged sword, as it proved to be in Hawaii. On the one hand, there were multiple bright spots in the opening decades:

- Spiritually, the church grew mightily. Already in 1824 and 1825 the missionaries were reporting “the outpouring of the Spirit of God upon the islands” which “brought thousands … into praying circles or societies.” After some years, numbers of the notable High Chiefs and Chiefesses relocated just to be near the missionaries where they could learn the

5 “Evangelism” is here understood in the sense defined by the widely-embraced 1974 Lausanne Covenant stating: Our Christian presence in the world is indispensable to evangelism, and so is that kind of dialogue whose purpose is to listen sensitively in order to understand. But evangelism itself is the proclamation of the historical, biblical Christ as Saviour and Lord, with a view to persuading people to come to him personally and so be reconciled to God. (Clause 4, “The Nature of Evangelism—The Lausanne Covenant,” Website of the Lausanne Movement. Available at: https://www.lausanne.org/content/covenant/lausanne-covenant#cov

6 H. Bingham, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands: Of the Civil, Religious, and Political History of Those Islands (Rutland, VT: Tuttle Publishing, Kindle Edition, 2011), loc. 1389. I have omitted from this passage Bingham’s description of their goal of introducing the “usages of a civilized and Christianized” society, wanting to leave this thorny subject for later attention.

7 Indeed, so wide-ranging were their interests that they had to explain to their correspondents back home why they did not just limit themselves to preaching and Bible translation. So in 1847 Artemas Bishop wrote back to the Boston board from his mission station in Oahu:

It may possibly occasion surprise in many of your readers that your missionaries so often speak of secular concerns of this nation. But it should be borne in mind that the permanence of Christianity here is in a great measure dependent upon the permanency of this people as a nation. (Artemas Bishop to Rev. Alexander, Oct. 1, 1847, Houghton Library, Harvard University, ABC 19.1, v. 2 [233] (1844-1859) Volume 14, #242)

8 Bingham 2011:loc. 10721.
9 Bingham 2011:loc. 10773.
10 Bingham 2011:loc. 7987.
message of salvation.\(^\text{11}\) After only seven years of the missionaries being on the island of Hawaii, the locals had already built a church capable of seating 4,800 people, with occasionally crowds of over ten thousand gathering to hear the preaching.\(^\text{12}\) Again, 20 years later a congregation of at least 10,000 assembled on the western shore of Hawaii as waves of revival hit the islands in 1837-1838.\(^\text{13}\)

- Politically, Hawaii secured its independence from outside colonizers then roaming the Pacific. It did so by adapting a western, constitutional form of government that outside nations felt bound to respect.\(^\text{14}\) By 1840 Hawaiians had developed their own Constitution, starting with a “Declaration of Rights, Both of the Chiefs and People.” Its very first sentence shows both the Christian (its focus on “God”) and Western (its focus on “rights”) influence:

  “God hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the earth,” in unity and blessedness. God has also bestowed certain rights alike on all men and all chiefs, and all people of all lands.\(^\text{15}\)

- Economically, trade and business progressed markedly, introducing increasing prosperity for both commoners\(^\text{16}\) (patchily) and chiefs (mightily, up through the 1840s\(^\text{17}\)).

These were all positives.

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\(^\text{11}\) Bingham 2011:loc. 4389, 4604

\(^\text{12}\) Bingham 2011:loc. 6491, 6544.


\(^\text{14}\) Unfortunately, Western nations only conceded political recognition and independence according to that state’s perceived “standard of civilization,” written constitutions serving as one evidence of that. Arnulf Lorca, lecturer in public international law at King’s College London writes that in the 19th century, “Classical international law only recognized equality between states belonging to the ‘family of civilized nations,’ while sovereign autonomy and equality was denied beyond the West.” (A. Lorca, “Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation,” Harvard International Law Journal 51, no. 2 (2010):475-552, 549n236 (citing J. Lorimer, The Institutes of Law (London: Blackwood and Sons, 1880), 101))


\(^\text{16}\) See, for instance, Kirch and Sahlins comment that the “coming of the whalers [1819e.] gave the ‘lower’ social sphere of commoner exchange a considerable stimulus.” (P. Kirch and M. Sahlins, Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the Kingdom of Hawaii, vol. 1, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 108). And see S. La Croix and J. Roumasset, “The Evolution of Private Property in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii,” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 50, no. 4 (Dec. 1990):829-852, 843 (“…throughout the 1830s and early 1840s the income of the king and the chiefs fell, while the lot of the commoner improved.”) The impetus to trade had started even before the arrival of the missionaries, with the large-scale sending sandalwood to China from 1812 (until exhausted in 1830). But this sandalwood trade enriched only the king and chiefs, the commoners being left out.

\(^\text{17}\) The chiefs profited mightily from their control sandalwood trade up until 1830 and afterward through trading with the whalers. See R. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom: 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1938), 89-90; Kirch and Sahlins 1992:1-4. Kirch and Sahlins add that, “By the mid-1850s, the chiefs were finished as a ruling class. The forced labor system finally did them in … impoverishing and alienating the producing people…. [T]he ruling chiefs, their wealth and authority thus undermined, could not then withstand the Haole…. “ (Kirch and Sahlins 1992: 113-114)
On the other hand, there were disappointing negatives:

- Church growth and vitality, so encouraging in the first half of the nineteenth century, seemed to stall in its second half;\(^{18}\) and at the same time, the tension between the white missionary administrators and local, native Hawaiian church pastors escalated.\(^{19}\)

- The indigenous population plummeted alarmingly, from approximately 300,000 when Cook arrived in 1778, to 134,750 in 1823 shortly after the missionaries’ arrival, to 71,015 in 1853 shortly before the ABCCFM pronounced Hawaii evangelized, to 37,656 in 1890, three years before Queen Liliuokalani was overthrown.\(^{20}\) Multiple 19th century Hawaiian kings identified this as their number one concern, but never were able to reverse it.\(^{21}\)

- Economic development—eagerly embraced by all levels of Hawaiians\(^{22}\)—intended to better the lot of common Hawaiians, seemed, especially after 1860, to pass most of them by. The indigenous Hawaiians fell increasingly behind; even the king and the great chiefs struggled in the new economy. 1848 ushered in the momentous Great Māhele (land division) of 1848 in which Hawaii’s land was distributed\(^{23}\) thus:

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\(^{22}\) Kirch 2012:191 (noting that already in the 16th century that Hawaii had turned in part from a subsistence economy to production and use of surplus); Kirch and Sahlins 1992:57-58 (describing the Hawaiian ali’i’s (nobility) determined accumulation and conspicuous consumption of trade goods during the sandalwood trade period (1812-13); U. Lisiensky, A Voyage Round the World: In the Years 1803, 4, 5, & 6 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, & Brown, 1814), 102 (describing the islanders’ desire in 1804 for knives, looking glasses and coarse linens); E. Damon, Father Bond of Kohala: A Chronicle of a Pioneer Life in Hawaii (Honolulu: The Friend, 1927), 172, 178 (Elias Bond’s letters observing the 1840s and 50s emigration of rural Hawaiians to Honolulu chasing the higher wages there); J. Adler and R. Kamins, “The Political Debut of Walter Murray Gibson,” The Hawaiian Journal of History 18 (1984):96-115, 111 (even the populist, pro-Hawaiian cabinet minister Gibson (1882-87), who stoked racial animus against the white oligarchy, was strongly pro-economic growth).

\(^{23}\) Prior to 1848, it had been customary in Hawaii to have, upon the death of the king, all rights in land revert to the new king (or king/chief of each island) to then re-distribute to his own chosen ali’i. Land did not belong to individuals in perpetuity. King Kamehameha II had, upon the death of his father in 1819, begun to soften this...
- 49% of the land was reserved for government use,
- 25% to the Crown, and
- 25% to 252 chiefs (ali‘i) and their land managers (konohiki).24

But neither the kings nor the great chiefs could turn their lands to profitability. The chiefs’ attempt to do so was doubly difficult given that by 1857 Hawaii’s population decline “had led to many agricultural lands being abandoned.”25 Kings Kamehameha III and IV so indebted themselves, burdening their “Crown lands” with such heavy mortgages, that the Hawaiian legislature agreed (1865f.) to assume their debt, but only on the condition that they first tie the monarchy’s hands by prohibiting the lands’ alienability.26 As to the chiefs, Hawaiian historian Lilikala Kame‘eleihiwa noted: “Yet none of these Ali‘i Nui [highest nobility] made terribly good businessmen…. In forty years time [from the Māhele] most of the Ali‘i Nui ‘Āina [land] had passed into foreign control….”27

- Lastly, largely driven by a growing split between Native Hawaiians holding significant political power28 and an Anglo-Saxon minority (not all of whom were “foreigners,” as many were born in Hawaii) wielding significant economic power, the political scene exploded in 1893.29 The chiefly Anglo-Saxon oligarchy—though not primarily “Big

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25 La Croix and Roumasset 1990:841-42.
26 T.M. Spaulding, The Crown Lands of Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1923), 10, 12-14. Similarly, later, when Queen Liliuokalani succeeded to the throne after the death of King Kalākaua in 1891), she found the Crown lands’ revenues greatly stripped by his extravagance (see H. Allen, The Betrayal of Liliuokalani (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1982), 258)
27 Kame‘eleihiwa 2012:loc. 5418)
28 Foreigners were increasingly important at the highest levels of government, with the King’s privy council made up largely of non-native Hawaiians. Kirch and Sahlins describe Hawaii as “a mixed state, dominated at the highest levels by Haole – and increasingly by Haole interests – but at the middle and local level by the Hawaiian aristocracy. The ali‘i were able to retain control of the chiefships of the districts and governorships of the Islands: an authority that … allowed them the continued disposition of Hawaiian lands, labor, and the surplus product.” (Kirch and Sahlins 1992:118) That said, the monarchy was always a formidable political power—at least until the “Bayonet Constitution” of 1889—as demonstrated by King Kamehameha V’s (r. 1863-1872) dismissing, against the desires of most of the white community, the constitution of 1852 and setting himself up as a sovereign with wide-ranging powers. (See Helena Allen, Sanford Ballard Dole: Hawaii’s Only President, 1844-1926, (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1988), 27) And see King Kalākaua’s (r. 1874-1891) career: installed as king against the wishes of most Americans in Hawaii (see Kuykendall 1967:5-6), he then proceeded to rule so contrary to the wishes of the large non-native business community that he took the drastic course of forcing upon King Kalākaua the “Bayonet Constitution.”

The Friend newspaper even observed how unusual it was in the 19th century for the “native race” to have such political power, writing in 1891 about King Kalākaua’s death: “He has been the first and only monarch to travel around the globe, just as his kingdom has been the only one largely colonized by whites, in which a native race and dynasty have continued dominant.” (“The King is Dead!” The Friend, February 1891:9)
29 Kuykendall 1967:277-8. Kirch and Sahlins describe Hawaii as “a mixed state, dominated at the highest levels by Haole – and increasingly by Haole interests – but at the middle and local level by the Hawaiian aristocracy. The ali‘i were able to retain control of the chiefships of the districts and governorships of the Islands: an authority that … allowed them the continued disposition of Hawaiian lands, labor, and the surplus product.” (Kirch and Sahlins 1992:118)
Sugar”—overthrew the native Queen Liliuokalani, followed five years later by the loss of Hawaiian political independence, when annexed by the United States. Contrary to the wishes of previous generations of indigenous Hawaiians, foreign-born Hawaiians, and missionaries, Hawaii was no longer a sovereign nation. The two-edged sword that is business now cut against what many native Hawaiians saw then as their best interest.

- The result today is that, while there are many successful Hawaiian individuals, native Hawaiians as a group have a “disproportionate share of Hawaii’s school dropouts, prison inmates, welfare recipients” and too many have a sense of “heaviness and grief” at their “long history of Hawaiians marginalized in their own land.”

Here, then, we see the potential downside of business development. On the one hand, business development is a gift of God to mankind. God told his Old Testament people, the Jews, “I am bringing you into a good land … where bread will not be scarce and you will lack nothing” (Deut. 8:7-9). Lacking nothing and overcoming scarcity was God’s idea of blessing. He then added that this blessing was not simply dropped straight from heaven, but that they had a role in this overcoming of scarcity: through their successful economic activity—an activity which he would enable: “But remember the Lord your God, for it is he who gives you the ability to produce wealth…” (Deut. 8:18). God gives the ability. But this ability can be misused, as he next warned them: “If you ever forget the Lord your God” and say to yourselves that, “My power and the strength of my hands have produced this wealth for me,” then instead of business bringing a blessing and an overcoming of scarcity for all, then, “I testify against you today that you will surely be destroyed” (Deut. 8:17-19). Destruction is a possibility. Business and economic activity has both the potential for good and the potential for evil.

**Still Pressed Ahead: to do Good despite the Risks**

The missionaries were keen to introduce business development to Hawaiians because they were convinced it was part of God’s intended blessings for Hawaii, both spiritual and physical. Hiram Bingham recorded, at the end of their first year together, the mutual hopes of both the missionaries and the Hawaiian chiefs:

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30 Helena Allen observes, contrary to popular opinion, that, “Most of the planters [as late as 1892] were opposed to annexation, as were many of the commercial and businessmen.” (Allen 1982:269); Haley concurs saying “sugar was not the reason” for the annexation (J. Haley, Captive Paradise: A History of Hawaii (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), Kindle loc. 5771-5773, 5987-5988). See too A. Farrell, “Preface” to L.A. Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co., Ltd., 1936), ix-x (“These memoirs should destroy the delusion that the revolution was a ferment of sugar…. But Mr. Thurston records the conservatism of Mr. Baldwin and Paul Isenberg at the mass meeting of 1887—of greater consequence, the opposition of Claus Spreckels to annexation [all central to “Big Sugar”]. Briefly put, the overthrow was compassed by attorneys….“).  
31 Gerrit Judd (1803-1873), early missionary doctor and then cabinet minister, was typical in both working hard for and rejoicing in Hawaii’s political independence (see Judd to Rev. David Greene, Jan. 25, 1845, in Letters of Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, 1827-1872 (Fragments II), 170-174 (cited in Kuykendall 1938:238). Even revolutionary firebrands Lorrin Thurston and Sereno Bishop only turned pro-annexationist late in their lives (see Kuykendall 1967:509-10, 565)  
The next day, with several chiefs, he [the king] visited our families; and, on being assured anew of our unvarying intention to do him good, and not evil, to elevate the nation, and promote their prosperity and salvation, he confirmed the original permission granted us, to remain and labor as missionaries….  

"To do him good” and to “elevate the nation” was their mutual goal. Had they fast forwarded to Hawaii in 1898—with its depleted native population and lost independence—they would have both been distressed and heart-sore. This was not what they were aiming for when they started. At the same time, they knew, in fact, that in opening the door to foreigners they were playing with fire.

This was clear to both natives and missionaries. Already in 1840, Richard Armstrong, while pastor of the central church wrote his brother-in-law of his fears that:

… unless the natives can arise & cope with foreigners in trade, agriculture and various sorts of business, they will never be anything more than hewers of wood and drawers of water for foreigners.  

And considerably later, in 1868 white legislator, Joseph Carter, told missionary Orramel Gulick that Kamehameha V would probably live to regret his support for the planters and imported bonded labor: "I think," wrote Carter, "that in fostering the planting interest he will find that he has warmed a viper into life and action only to have it turn upon him."  

Hawaiian commoners themselves were nervous about their own ability to compete economically with outsiders. Already in 1845, as the king considered granting citizenship and equal rights to foreigners, Hawaiian commoners flooded him with numerous petitions pleading for restraint:

What is to be the result of so many foreigners taking the oath of allegiance?—This is it, in our opinion; this kingdom will pass into their hands, and that too very soon.

Foreigners come on shore with cash, ready to purchase land; but we have not the means to purchase lands; the native is disabled like one who has long been afflicted with a disease upon his back. We have lived under the chiefs, thinking to do whatever they desired, but not according as we thought; hence we are not prepared to compete with foreigners, we shall immediately be overcome….  

Along similar lines, the Rev. E.W. Clark was ominously clear-headed when, in answering the detailed government questionnaire of 1846, he replied:

Encouraging the settlement of honest and industrious foreigners, as mechanics and small capitalists, would help give scope to native industry, and increase the knowledge of the arts and usages of civilized life. But it needs not much wisdom to predict that any great monopoly of plantations, and sudden influx of a promiscuous foreign population would prove disastrous to the native population, if not to the foreign capital invested. It would, almost inevitably lead to a disregard of native rights, to serious contentions, and to a system of subjection and servitude, which would soon end in the slavery or extinction of the native government and race…. That the native race cannot be preserved, improved, and elevated, without foreign

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34 Bingham 2011:loc. 2924-2930. King Liholiho had originally granted the missionaries permission to stay for a probationary year.  
aid of various kinds, is admitted by all. Let this aid then, be employed in the wisest manner to secure the rights and interests of all.38 Nevertheless, despite the risks, the Hawaiian king and his chiefs, in consort with their missionary advisors, pressed ahead. As to why they pressed ahead, Clark’s observations above suggest the reason when he writes, “That the native race cannot be preserved, improved, and elevated, without foreign aid of various kinds, is admitted by all.”

The Necessary Foreign Connection

That the Rev. Clark’s viewpoint was more than just a western prejudice seems clear from the fact that long before the missionaries’ arrival in 1820, Hawaiian power and wealth had been irreversibly connected to its foreign associations. It was the early kings’ trade (since Captain Cook in 1778) with Westerners giving them access to the weapons—muskets, cannon, ships (along with the training necessary to use them)—that enabled them to defeat their enemies, and finally empowered that masterful strategist Kamehameha I to be the first to conquer and unify the entire Hawaiian archipelago (1810).39 The extent of Western prestige can be gauged from the fact that, even before one missionary had set foot on Hawaii, prominent Hawaiians appeared on public occasions in full western dress, even having adopted foreign names: Billy Pitt, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, etc.40

This embrace of foreign influence and ways was also evident in Kamehameha III rule (r. 1825-1854). He found it necessary to protect Hawaii’s independence against foreign trouble-makers within41 and colonizers without42 by adopting a more western way of governing: he deliberately

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38 R.C. Wyllie, Answers to Questions Posed by His Excellency (Honolulu: Government Printer, 1848), 11. Wyllie, a Scotsman doctor-and-banker, had arrived in Hawaii in 1844 and served as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and then as Minister of Foreign Relations from 1845 to 1865. In 1846 he posed 115 questions to the missionaries—on the assumption that, scattered throughout the islands in daily contact with native Hawaiians as they were, they would have an informed (albeit colored) perspective on the state of the nation—on how the government might introduce policies truly beneficial to the social and economic betterment of native Hawaiians. Rev. E.W. Clark arrived in Hawaii in 1828, with the third company of missionaries, staying until his death until 1878. He was the third pastor of the influential Kawaiaha'o Church, from 1848 to 1878.

39 Already during his visits between 1792-1794 the English Captain George Vancouver was teaching Kamehameha how to drill his men, and by 1810 he had 42 western sloops and schooners at his disposal (Kuykendall 1938:41-43, 48-50); Kalanikupule conquered Oahu in 1794 with the help of two English ships of war and guns and ammunition that they supplied (Kuykendall 1938:46), only to lose it all in 1795 to Kamehameha in the battle of Nuuanu, in which “Kamehameha’s artillery, served by foreigners, played an important part…..” (Kuykendall 1938:47). Having seen the power Britain ships and guns, and trusting Vancouver’s good will, Kamehameha ceded Hawaii, or put it as a protectorate, under King George III of England (see Kuykendall 1938:41-43, 54; D.K. Sai, Ua Mau Ke Ea Sovereignty Endures: An Overview of the Political and Legal History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu: Pū‘ā Foundation 2011), 23-24)

40 R. Cox, Adventures on the Colombia River (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1831), 49.

41 Kuykendall, Kingdom: 1778-1854, 187.

42 The threat of colonization was particularly acute in the Pacific in those days as New Zealand had been declared a British colony in 1841 and Tahiti a French protectorate in 1842. Then, New Caledonia was possessed by the French in 1853 and made a colony in 1864.
crafted a form of constitutional government and patterns of diplomacy conforming to foreign customs.\textsuperscript{43}

Hawaiian prosperity had for decades been closely linked with and dependent on foreign nations. International trade had made both Hawaiian monarchs and chiefs wealthy—even while accruing large debts—first through the sandalwood trade (1812-1830) and then through provisioning the whalers (1830-1860). Without such international trade, Hawaii would have lapsed back into its older “production for use” economy providing a mere “subsistence” economy—albeit a comfortable subsistence—and such a retreat is something that most Hawaiians wanted to avoid.\textsuperscript{47}

Of course, it is tragically true that Western contact had not just brought the “preservation, improvement, and elevation” which Rev. Clark referenced. It also brought, in the 42 years prior to the missionaries’ coming, the epidemics—measles, smallpox, influenza, tuberculosis—and drastically shrinking birth rate due to venereal diseases which were rapidly depopulating Hawaii.\textsuperscript{48}


\textsuperscript{44} In 1839 the French Captain Laplace, in his frigate \textit{L’Artemise}, landed his marines, coercing the Hawaii’s laws to implement certain laws more favorable to the French, then absconding with $20,000 as guarantee of future good performance. Similarly, in 1843, Captain George Paulet arrived in the HMS \textit{Carysfort}, coerced a provisional cession of Hawaii to Britain, destroying all Hawaiian flags and raising the Union Jack over Hawaii. Such behavior was only put a stop to because Hawaii could send skilled representatives—ex-missionary William Richards and the young chief Timothy Haalilio—around the European capitals to negotiate the recognition of Hawaiian independence in November, 1843. (Kuykendall 1938:191-192, 202)


\textsuperscript{46} “[E]ven with these substantial taxes and land rents, the common people lived well above subsistence levels,” given that “a significant portion of income in the Polynesian economic system is leisure.” (La Croix & Roumasset 1990:832-833)

To say that ancient Hawaii lived by a “production for use” economy—aiming at “subsistence” versus a “surplus” for trade—does not mean its monarchs and chiefs were strangers to luxury. Archeologist Patrick Kirch points out that already in the sixteenth century, under the famous warrior king ‘Umi, the intricately developed 23 square miles of irrigated gardens in the northeastern quadrant of the Big Island produced a surplus enabling ‘Umi to develop his royal court surrounded by his retainers and court hangers-on. (Kirch 2012:191)

\textsuperscript{47} Hawaiians’ attachment to the wealth brought in by western trade was evidenced by the chiefs’ eager pursuit of the sandalwood profits and by the way the commoners in the countryside so often flocked to the cities to earn otherwise impossible-to-obtain dollars. (See J. Cook, \textit{Reminiscences of John Cook Kahamaaina} (Honolulu: The New Freedom Press, 1927), 6; V. Schweitzer, “Tides of a Mission,” \textit{Coffee Times}, August 1998. Available at: http://www.coffeetimes.com/aug98.htm; Gilbert Farquhar Mathison, \textit{Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru and the Sandwich Islands During the Years 1821 and 1822} (London: Charles Knight, 1825), 408-409, 455) (noting Governor Cox’s being “very covetous and found of money withal, and knows how to drive a hard bargain. The mention of his wealth and power as very great, gives him infinite satisfaction…” and noting the other chiefs’ addiction to trade.)

\textsuperscript{48} See emeritus professor of medical microbiology and medical history at the University of Hawaii, O. Bushnell, \textit{The Gifts of Civilization: Germs and Genocide in Hawaii} (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 145, 273, 294. The Rev. Sheldon Dibble in 1843 bitterly remarked on his countrymen’s contribution from the “Christian nations”: “Sin and death were the first commodities imported to the Sandwich Islands. As though their former ruin were not sufficient, Christian nations superadded a deadlier evil [the venereal diseases]. That evil is sweeping the population
Nevertheless, those in power agreed that western contact and a degree of westernization was the way forward. The problem was that it was too late to turn back. Western contact could not be undone and would only increase in the future. Western trade and connections were simply too important to the Hawaiians. The issue was not whether to continue with western contact and westernization but how to manage it. The missionaries, in consultation with the Hawaiian leaders, eventually chose four approaches to manage westernization: education and training for the ruling class, concrete modeling for the commoners (the maka‘āinana in Hawaiian), vocational training for both commoners and middle nobility, and policy advice to the king.

Measure 1: Education for the Ruling Class

Here the chiefs themselves led the way. That is, education and equipping was their first concern and request. In 1836 they wrote to the ABCFM with this request: “Give us additional teachers … a teacher of the chiefs in what pertains to the land, according to the practice of enlightened countries.” Education was to be the first step; becoming familiarized with the ways of the wider world and therefore equipped to better deal with it. No teacher being forthcoming from America, William Richards, having been in Hawaii since 1823, laid down in 1838 his commission as a missionary and accepted the chiefs’ invitation to be their “Chaplain, Teacher and Translator … on every subject connected with government and on their duties as rulers of the nation.” Subsequently Dr. Gerrit Judd, having been in Hawaii since 1828, also laid aside in 1842 his formal ABCFM missionary commission in order to serve as King Kamehameha III’s advisor and translator, and then as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1843 onwards.

Still wanting other avenues of equipping, the high chiefs then wrote the missionaries during their 1839 General Meeting, asking them to establish a school specifically for the royal children. Republican anti-monarchists that most of the missionaries were, they hesitated in singling out the royals for special treatment, thereby diverting scarce resources to so few beneficiaries. In the end, however, the missionaries acquiesced and established the boarding school, which did train all the monarchs right up to Queen Liliuokalani. The missionaries are to be credited, at this point, for going against their own American instincts and listening to the native Hawaiians. In this they are a positive example to BAM practitioners today, of the importance of listening to the host culture.

Measure 2: Concrete Modeling for Hawaiian “Commoners”

Beyond equipping the rulers, the missionaries also focused on their local and less exalted parishioners, the commoners (the maka‘āinana in Hawaiian). We see, for instance, the Rev. Richard Armstrong, along with his preaching duties, wrote from his station at Wailuku, Maui, July 7, 1840 concerning his introduction of the simple labor-saving device of yoked oxen:

to the grave with amazing rapidity…. [N]ew modes of crime and new modes of accelerated destruction were introduced from Christian countries.” (S. Dibble, History of the Sandwich Islands (Lahainaluna: Press of the Mission Seminary, 1843), 33, 43) Dibble arrived in Hawaii in 1831 where his first two children died young, his first wife dying in 1839 and he himself going to the grave in 1845 at the age of 36.

50 The ABCFM had a policy of political non-involvement by their missionaries as missionaries. See Anderson 1870:135-136. Thus was it necessary for Richards to separate from the mission upon entering governmental service.  
51 Kuykendall 1938:154.  
I devote occasionally a little time to agriculture and would devote more, if I had it to spare. It is a business that I was brought up to, and I love it, as I love sleep when weary…. I have assisted the natives to break in some twelve yoke of oxen, which have done a great deal towards relieving the people of their burdens. Three years ago everything, food, timber, potatoes, pigs, stones, lime, sand, etc., were carried on the backs of natives, or dragged on the ground by their hands . . . but almost all this drudgery is now done by carts and oxen, and the head men say they cannot get the men on their lands to submit to such work as they once could. This is clear gain.  

He went on in the same letter to explain that not only was he equipping his people with tools, but also encouraging them to enter into business:

By a request of the King I have taken some part in inducing the people about me to plant sugar-cane. A fine crop of sixty or seventy acres is now on the ground ripe, and a noble water-mill, set up by a China-man, is about going into operation to grind it. I hope some good from this quarter. I keep one plough a going constantly with a view to the support of schools. We shall get in ten acres of cane the present season.

From the *Sandwich Island Mirror* in 1840 we read of numerous joint businesses initiatives—partnerships between the missionaries and the Hawaiians—in sugar (far smaller than the vast sugar plantations of the 1860s and forward) which were grinding cane for the natives on shares (i.e. each person taking a share of the profit or loss):

Rev. Artemas Bishop at Ewa had a mill run by water power, where he had made for himself and the natives during the past season several tons of sugar, besides molasses; Rev. Hiram Bingham had raised sugar cane on his field, having it manufactured at a Chinese mill in the back part of Honolulu; Dr. T. C. B. Rooke had a mill in Nuuanu valley; three or four native young men had begun to develop a small plantation in the Koolau district; Governor Kekuanaoa, Dr. Judd, and others had organized a company to establish a plantation and mill near Honolulu; on Maui, several Chimen had mills in operation, where they made sugar upon shares.  

Missionaries such as Elias Bond in the isolated Kohala district of the Big Island were constantly concerned for the economic well-being of their parishioners, as evident from his 1863 report to the Board back in Boston:

It has long been with a source of deep regret, that in our entire District there were no enterprises whatever by means of which the people could acquire desirable physical comforts. Our field in this respect has ever been the poorest in the Islands. I have endeavored to seek profitable means of industry for our people, as essential to good morals & to a desirable social condition of this community. Until the present year however… fruitless. Now it is my privilege to report a Sugar Plantation in progress among us, the stock of which is owned or controlled by good men & the enterprise is conducted with constant regard to the well-being of its employees, in every respect. Hitherto the results have fully answered the hope & expectations cherished in inaugurating the enterprise.  

Equally important to Bond was the humane treatment of his Hawaiian workers. Regretfully observing about sugar plantation employees, “The people are treated as mere beasts of burden, even where professing Christians control them,” he wrote in 1866 to his own plantation’s agents in Honolulu:

If he [the troublesome manager] returns to Kohala Sugar Company, it must be on condition that the people shall be allowed to hold their regular weekly meeting. They must be allowed a newspaper, if they wish.

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54 Kuykendall 1938:180.  
Above all, flogging must be abandoned. We must try to train men, not brutes…. This style of management must be abandoned.\(^56\)

Bond was every bit the “sacrificial leader” and entrepreneur which Courtney Rountree-Mills identified in her research (2009-2019) on Kenya as the inescapable vital key to the next stage accelerating job growth for less developed countries.\(^57\) His sacrifice is clear not only in his persevering through the long early years when the Kohala Sugar Plantation made no money,\(^58\) but, when it did finally make money, in his giving away his own profit to schools and to the mission board: one year (1885) he gave the then enormous sum of $48,000.\(^59\) Admittedly, in this, Bond was not typical of most sugar plantation directors, but his case does show the modeling the missionaries tried to give. Here too is a good model for today’s BAM practitioners.

**Measure 3: Vocational Training for Both Commoners and Middle Nobility**

Beyond these concrete efforts, the missionaries also engaged in an intensive and holistic training effort for the commoners and middle nobility.\(^60\) They set up a number of boarding schools, staffed by themselves, designed to equip the Hawaiians for various professions: Hawaii’s “future lawyers and doctors” and the like.\(^61\) The biggest and longest-serving schools were at Hilo, on the Big Island, and at Lahainaluna on Oahu. In several respects these institutions were actually ahead of education efforts on the American mainland.\(^62\)

And they were successful on many fronts. Indeed, “Lahainaluna Seminary was the premier training institution for most of the prominent and most influential Hawaiians” serving in multiple fields in the 19th century: “legislators …, Cabinet officials, Privy Councilors, governors,” etc., etc.\(^63\) On one front, however, they do not seem to have been successful: in launching native Hawaiians in droves into the business arena.\(^64\)

\(^{56}\) Damon 1927:186, 190-191, 196 (emphasis in the original).

\(^{57}\) See “A Call to Startups to Start Making Disciples,” Lausanne Movement, July 17, 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goMt57CE2kI&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR378_uS-PevktBYRNsQVwQUAnarjhdVEB-HuBLFX4W4gARgimnVli4558

\(^{58}\) “While Bond, with the help of Castle & Cooke, started the business in 1862, it was only by 1875 they got out of debt (he owed Castle & Cooke $35,000)—13 years later!—and paid its first dividend.” (F. Taylor, E. Welty, & D. Eyre, *From Land and Sea: The Story of Castle & Cooke of Hawaii* (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1976), 76.) Indeed, by 1870 Bond was tempted to give up hope, writing in a letter of March 26, 1870, “As to any income from the Plantation, I give up the hope. I should be very thankful, however, could we get out of debt. As to selling the Plantation it would be an act of betrayal of the Master for me to sell my shares. I counted the cost and have never repented. Those who control the Plantation in a large measure control the welfare of the District…."

(Damon 1927:195)

\(^{59}\) Schweitzer 1998; Damon 1927:196, 198.

\(^{60}\) Carl Beyer, “Manual and Industrial Education for Hawaiians During the 19th Century,” *The Hawaiian Journal of History*, vol. 38 (2004):8-10) (The Lahainaluna students “were for the most part kaukau ali`i, a class of Hawaiians who were used to serving and following the orders of the ali`i nui (high chiefs)."


\(^{62}\) Lahainaluna High School in being also a teacher training school (i.e., a “normal school”) “preceded the first American normal school by eight years.” (Beyer Journal:8-10). Also, Hilo Boarding School was “unique” with its “agricultural curriculum began 26 years before the Congress of the United States made federal land grants available to found similar schools in 1862.” (Beyer PhD 2004:216-217)

\(^{63}\) Beyer PhD 2004:243.

\(^{64}\) Beyer’s PhD research, when quickly detailing Hilo’s 400 graduates does not mention any businessmen among the graduates. (Beyer PhD 2004:217) And when detailing Lahainaluna’s stellar list of fields entered, the only real business fields mentioned are “lawyers, surveyors.” Most graduates seemed to go into government, literary fields, and the church. (Beyer PhD 2004:243)
Why this lack? Was it Hawaiians’ work culture—a “production for use” approach aiming at minimal subsistence in contrast to the foreigners’ “production for exchange” value aiming at surplus—combined with the simple fact of an admitted “lack of interest in shop keeping,” combined with the “Polynesian political economy of grandeur” which devalued saving as community-neglecting “stinginess”? Was it, on the other hand, a lack of opportunity in the face of the white business community’s closed doors? It is hard to say. For BAM practitioners today, asking these sorts of questions and being aware of similar dynamics in their host cultures would be important, given that job-creation is an important BAM goal. Seeing what the blockages are and discovering creative ways around them must be part of a BAM practitioner’s mindset.

Some see a nefarious conspiracy theory at work in the Hawaiian educational system, alleging a deliberate “dumbing down” through its emphasis on manual and vocational training. But this is unlikely given that a fair number of the US universities at which the American missionaries themselves were educated equally had this manual training emphasis; given that Bernice Pauahi Bishop’s own will of 1833—unarguably designed for the betterment of her fellow native Hawaiians—itself similarly insisted on the “instruction in the higher branches [i.e. purely academic] to be subsidiary to … useful knowledge as may tend to make good and industrious men and women”; and given that native Hawaiian historian Samuel Kamakau (1815-1876) himself questioned the usefulness of the heavily academic load at Lāhaināluna Seminary, asking “where is it leading?” in light of many native Hawaiians remaining unemployed. No missionary conspiracy seems to be at work here. In advocating manual and vocational training, these missionary institutions were not trying to hinder Hawaiians or “dumb them down”; rather they were genuine efforts to equip Hawaiians with practical skills with which to enter the workforce.

**Measure 4: Public Policy Advice**

Lastly, venturing beyond mere education, the missionaries’ final strategy in assisting their Hawaiian colleagues to cope with westernization was to enter into the somewhat treacherous field of policy advice. Of course, as BAM practitioners today discover, interacting with the government is inevitable when involved in economic activity. One cannot nor should one seek to stay aloof. At the simplest level, interaction with the government is inevitable given that the local laws and regulations need to be learned and heeded. Beyond that, as to entering into policy shaping, here

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67 Kirch and Sahlins 1992:57-58 (“The debt is a direct testimony to the contribution of the Hawaiian system to its own demise…. For it was not simply the present good or goods present that made the folly of the Hawaiian ali‘i but certain obsessions that were at once conventional and cosmological. Their consuming frenzy represented a Polynesian political economy of grandeur. Mana was a powerful source of their desire….’’); Cook 2011:331-332 (“Unlike the Chinese, Japanese, and haole, Native Hawaiians tended to stay away from mercantile operations, in part because of the lack of capital and in part because of a lack of interest in shop keeping, which had connotations of stinginess about it.”).
68 Beyer PhD 2004:xii-xiii.
69 For instance, both Princeton (Beyer’s journal article 2004:8-10) and Oberlin (R. Williams, “Claiming Christianity: the Struggle over God and Nation in Hawai‘i, 1880-1900” (Phd diss., University of Hawaii, 2013), 69) had this manual training component.
71 Beyer PhD 2004:247.
myriad approaches are possible. Developing that theme, however, is beyond the purview of this paper.

As to the missionaries’ approach in 19th century Hawaii, we have already seen above how William Richards, in 1838, and Dr. Gerrit Judd, in 1842, separated from the ABCFM—which had a policy of non-interference in political affairs—and entered governmental service. While these, and others such as a Richard Armstrong (Minister of Public Instruction from 1847), contributed in wide-ranging ways,72 their most noteworthy, and controversial, policy suggestion was the economic policy of the “Great Māhele” (meaning “division”) of 1848. It was a totally new venture for a nation unfamiliar with private ownership of land. In the Great Māhele the land was divided in fee simple ownership amongst the king, the government, the landlords, and the commoners.73

The missionaries’ motive in suggesting this was two-fold: first, to induce entrepreneurial business development by tying individual reward to land ownership. It was yours so you would accrue the benefit. The thinking was that without individual ownership, the commoners were “precluded from the hope of materially bettering their condition,” and thus without motivation to do so.74 Second, the missionaries perceived private property in land as a protection against chiefly oppression, chiefs who might otherwise swoop in and take as they pleased.75 The motivation from the Hawaiian side for embracing the suggested Great Māhele seems to have been four-fold: the hoped-for economic betterment of the nation, the protection of their land rights from potential outside colonizers (thought to respect clearly demarcated fee simple ownership), the need for increased government revenue in the face of a falling population, and the chiefs’ desire to profit from the sale of land given falling profits from their then-current land management.76

72 So, for instance, William Richards joined with King Kamehameha’s royal secretary, Timothy Ha’alilio (a young native chief and a Lahainaluna graduate), as envoys traveling to Britain, France and the USA (July 1842 till February 1844) to secure foreign recognition of Hawaii’s independence, an effort in which they were largely successful. (Kuykendall 1938:191-205, 205 n.57, 236)

73 Previously land had been held differently: sometimes described as “feudally” (whereby the crown was the ultimate owner and granted it to the lords, who in turn doled it out to lesser tenants in exchange for services); sometimes described as “held in common,” as in the Hawaiian Constitution of 1840 which stated: “Kamehameha I, … to him belonged all the land … though not as his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common….” (Constitution of 1840, art. 14. Available at http://hoolina.org/collect/journal/index/assoc/HASH0166.dir/5.pdf )

Kuykendall somewhat drily adds: “In practice, however, it made little difference to such a ruler as Kamehameha I whether he owned the land outright or merely in a representative capacity; in either case, he disposed of it as he saw fit, and probably it never occurred to him to theorize about it.” (Kuykendall 1938:269)

74 See Wyllie 1848:7.

75 See the Rev. Sheldon Dibble’s observations in his S. Dibble, History of the Sandwich Islands (Lahainaluna: Press of the Mission Seminary 1843), 73-74 (whose views on oppression cannot immediately be dismissed as “Hawaiian unfriendly” given that the Kirch and Sahlins remark that Sheldon Dibble, along with William Richards and perhaps Lorrin Thurston, was one of the “exceptions” to the numerous “ABCFM missionaries [who] were uninterested observers of Hawaiian custom, which they generally held in contempt.” (Kirch and Sahlins 1992:5)) Additionally, both native Hawaiian historians David Malo and Samuel Kamakau reference the oppressions that Hawaiian commoners had to undergo from their chiefs and landlords. (See David Malo’s remarks in his (first written up in 1838) David Malo, Hawaiian Antiquities, trans. N.B. Emerson (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., 1903), 85, 87, 258, and see S. Kamakau, Ruling Chiefs (Honolulu: Kamehameha Schools Press, 1992), 231)

76 See La Croix and Roumasset 1990:829-852; see the Rev. Elias Bond’s letter to ABCFM board, July 1, 1848, Houghton Library, Harvard University, ABC 19.1, v. 2 [233] (1844-1859) Volume 14, #261 (Bond observing, “Also, the lands of the chief are fast becoming valueless in consequence of the constant desertion of the people upon them.”); and see Kirch and Sahlins 1992:4 (“The measures [of the 1830s] failed to make the chiefs’ ownership of the
Opinions are divided as to how effective or hurtful this Great Māhele was. The division is especially sharp given that by 1850 it had only delivered 1% of the land to the commoners. Contrast this with the Crown’s having received 25%, the government 49%, and the 252 chiefs and landlords the final 25%.

Older opinions since the 1960s were united that this was a tragedy and a gross miscarriage of justice; an injustice grounded in Hawaiian ruling class’s docile, overly trusting compliance with the advice of their western (and mostly missionary) advisors.

Certainly a factor contributing to the commoners only receiving 1% of the land during the Māhele process was their poor understanding of land ownership (fee simple ownership being a recently imported concept, at least as applied to commoners), and the great difficulties for the commoners to travel long distances to register the land and annually pay the taxes. They lacked understanding of annual taxes and, living in a subsistence culture, they often lacked the cash necessary to make the payments.

More recently, however, a newer school of native Hawaiian scholars has arisen, fundamentally challenging this older school’s interpretation. They portray native Hawaiians, in opting for the Great Māhele, as authors of their fate, not its victims. They were not imposed upon; rather, as independent agents, they intelligently chose and adapted foreigners’ ways for their own use, as they crafted constitutions, introduced the Great Māhele of 1848, and subsequently developed political structures. This new school of Hawaiian scholarship suggests that the real dispossession problems did not arise with or from the Great Māhele itself, but only much later in 19th century: with certain later legal decisions, with the business community’s (not all but many) armed resistance to King Kalākaua in 1887, the coerced overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani in 1893, and America’s annexation of Hawaii in 1898 against the popular will of ethnic Hawaiians.

These two schools’ views on the Māhele of 1848 differ, then; but both schools agree wholeheartedly that the overthrow of 1893 and 1898 was a tragedy. On these dates Hawaii lost first its monarchy and then its political independence. This downfall was political; native Hawaiians lost their power of self-determination as an independent nation. A Rubicon had been crossed, and Hawaii was never more to be the same.

77 Preza 2010:20, 89.
78 Even before the Māhele of 1845 the Hawaiian kings had occasionally transferred land in a fee simple manner (under the control of the owner even after their death, i.e. inheritable by whomever they designated). So in 1839 and 1840 Kamehameha III had in this way transferred property to Thomas Phillips and Alexander Birch. (Perkins 2013:158). And even earlier under Kamehameha I we read, “Kamehameha gave his four uncles from Kona … and his potential rivals large tracts of lands in perpetuity, inheritable by their offspring…. This set a new precedent, as land had formerly reverted to the mōʻi upon the death of an Aliʻi Nui (high chief).” (Perkins 2013:134-135). But this sort of private property, fee simply ownership never occurred amongst the native Hawaiian commoners prior to the Māhele.
79 For a more extensive explanation of the contrast between this newer view of the Māhele and the older school, see my article for the Spring 2020 Spirits: ORU Journal of Theology journal. Mark ‘Umi Perkins, a contributor to this new school, defends the Māhele as a helpful measure, writing: An emerging view holds that the Māhele of 1848 was an … transition … that would allow for capitalist development. This institutionalist approach (see Sai, 2008, Beamer, 2006, Preza 2010) attempts to upend twentieth century critiques of the Māhele as capitalist exploitation, and replace it with positivist and legalist description of the Māhele as merely an institution of an emerging and modernizing nation-state. (M. Perkins, “Kuleana: A Genealogy of Native Tenant Rights” (PhD diss., University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, 2013), 44)
While the downfall was political—Hawaii’s monarchy overthrown and its independence lost—the chief engine driving these political events was economic. Hawaii’s fate can never be understood without grasping the economic forces at the overthrow’s root. Below, the political-economic interplay of the downfall is sketched in more detail, but first an important aside on the economic role of the missionaries’ descendants.

Missionary Descendants into the Workforce

It is oft-asserted that a chief cause of Hawaii’s downfall is down to the missionaries and their descendants who “came to do good, but ended up doing well.” That is, they lost their mission, greed took over, and the native Hawaiians ultimately paid the consequence. But it is impossible to understand the missionary children’s “doing well” without first seeing its historical trigger: the decisions taken from 1848-1863 by the missionaries’ Boston-based ABCFM, attempting to increasingly turn leadership over to native Hawaiians. Their “doing well” is really a downstream result of those board decisions.

The ABCFM put teeth into their decision to turn leadership over to native Hawaiians by steadily cutting the missionaries’ financial support, urging them to become Hawaiian citizens and to now support themselves—which inevitably meant pursuing secular employment. As Richard Armstrong (who became Minister of Public Instruction in 1848) explained to his brother-in-law Henry Chapman in a letter of 1850:

Many of the missionaries are securing tracts of land, with a view to their support…. Several are about to withdraw from the Board & seek their support here, which is just what will please the Board & all others who look to the permanent welfare of this nation. The native churches will never support the missionaries…. The missionaries will of necessity in this way be more or less engaged in secular pursuits, & the tongue of malice will not fail to hurl the most envenomed darts at their reputation, for money getting, world loving &c, as they do now at all of us.

For many of the missionaries this development was an unwelcome, indeed bitter, experience. Haley points out, “The missionary generation itself entered business uncertainly and unwillingly.” Abner Wilcox, for instance, having arrived with the eighth company of missionaries in 1837, felt betrayed as his support was steadily withdrawn. Writing to the board in 1861 he pleaded for their understanding:

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80 Joy Schulz, “What Hawaii Taught this Midwesterner about Her Own History,” Zócalo Public Square. Available at: https://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/02/09/hawaii-taught-midwesterner-identity/ideas/essay/; Kaori, This Life I’ve Loved (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937), 156. Liana Iaukea puts the position crudely but clearly: “The 1840s were critical years in Hawai‘i, and around that time the missionaries started leaving their posts and were more interested in obtaining land and money rather than saving souls for their unseen god.” (L. Iaukea, “Changing Attitudes of Education in Hawai‘i 1820-1920” (Master’s thesis, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, 2014), 670)


83 Haley 2014:loc. 3230-3234J
I was sent out with a limited education as a teacher, and advised to remain so—to labor and die at the Islands…. Perhaps I have followed the Board’s instructions too literally to mind my own work and receive bread from the Board….

Were I without a family, I would step quietly out of the way. But I have a family dependent on me. My youngest child is 3 years old. I have 5 children under age…. I shall soon die [indeed 8 years later he did]. Cannot the … Prudential Company… have patience with one poor man and feed him a few days longer?...

…I do not, however, like the idea of dropping all work of a missionary character and going into worldly business. How much the Board cautioned us against it formerly.84

His poverty deeply impressed his sons, one of whom (G.N. Wilcox) later started a successful sugar plantation on Kaua’i.

Before 1848 the missionaries had not been allowed to privately own land and houses; all that now changed.85 It was either find work, make money or starve. That they chose not to starve should be no cause for reproach.

Jean Hobbs, in her highly-respected 1935 study, rebuts the common assumption that the descendants of missionaries simply and easily built on the advantageous land gains their parents had previously acquired, writing:

a careful study of the tabulation in the appendix of this volume will soon refute the popular belief that large quantities of land, later to become the basis of fortunes in sugar, were left by individual missionaries to their children. Most of the land they acquired in any way during their lifetime was disposed of to supply the needs of growing families who had to be sent away for higher education and be given an opportunity to see … their American homeland.86

Lorrin Thurston, who growing up knew personally many of the “mission boys” who later became successful, wealthy businessman—Samuel T. Alexander, Henry P. Baldwin, Charles M. Cooke, and George N. Wilcox—recalls that, “Each began as a poor youngster,” explaining:

Samuel T. Alexander, the son of the missionary and one of the founders of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., returning to Hawaii from college in the East, stayed over to work in the mines of California. There he failed of riches, and arrived in Hawaii so short of money that his only pair of trousers was made of a flour sack—the seat bore the name “Golden Gate Flour Co.”87

These “mission boys” were indeed part of the economic scene that was so influential in Hawaii’s political downfall, a downfall sketched out below. But, as outlined in Part Two of this article, the downfall did not result from these missionary descendants having lost their love for Hawaii in their worship for filthy lucre. The tale is not as simple as that.

**Downfall Step 1: 1887 “Bayonet Constitution”**

Up until 1880, Hawaii’s internal politics (insofar as the native-Hawaiian-to-foreigner relation was concerned) operated relatively smoothly.88 Isabella Bird, that remarkable British woman who as explorer, writer, photographer, and naturalist was the first woman to be elected Fellow of the Royal

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87 Farrell 1936:4-8. Lorrin Thurston, of course, is no objective and disinterested writer, but this need not delay us because his assertions can be easily checked and verified.
88 I use the term “relatively” advisedly. That is, there is no denying that in the mid-1800s Hawaii had passed through turbulent times in its relations with foreigners, and the sense of “Hawaii for Hawaiians” continually popped up from time to time. I only assert that Hawaii had largely managed these troubles and passed through to a time of relative calm.
Geographical Society, in her world travels spent six months in Hawaii in 1872. After traveling the islands alone with Hawaiian hosts, speaking to them in their native tongue in their homes and around campfires, observed that the “relation between the foreign and native population is a kindly and happy one.” Hawaii’s The Friend newspaper in 1875 observed, “Hawaiians and foreigners, of various nationalities, mingle together in easy and familiar intercourse.”

In politics, Hawaii was a mixed and peculiarly stratified affair: native Hawaiians controlled both the local and the national-legislative level, additionally holding the highest position in the land (the monarch); on the other hand, foreigners and haoles (Hawaiian for “white person”) controlled the vitally important privy council advising the king. From 1851 (the first full-sized legislature) through 1880 “on the average, haoles comprised less than one-fourth of the total number of representatives” in the legislature. This sort of power sharing generally kept the peace right up to 1880. Then things changed.

The problem centered around King Kalākaua’s extravagance and overspending. Already in the 1870s, the King’s spendthrift ways had stirred the stiff-backed, native Hawaiian legislators Joseph Nawahi and George Pilipo to publicly censure the king on this score, concerned that he would squander the nation’s wealth. Then in late 1879 the larger-than-life Italian adventurer Celso Moreno landed on Hawaii’s shores. An impressive and clever man of wide-ranging foreign experience—wounded in the Crimean war, studied civil engineering at the University of Genoa, married to the sultan’s daughter while in Sumatra, a commercial agent for the French in China—and a gifted linguist who could speak more than a dozen languages, he plied Kalākaua with irresistible grand schemes: subsidies for the “opening to us of the great Emporium of Asia” through an ocean cable and a steamship connection between Hawaii and China, or a plan to make Honolulu the opium processing and distribution center for the whole Pacific area. Kalākaua found this sort of thing irresistible. He appointed Moreno as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Alarmed by Moreno’s extravagant plans, the previously quiescent business community was stirred into definite political action. A series of mass meetings were held in 1880 denouncing Moreno’s appointment. Eventually this new political activism led to the forming of the new Independent Party (1883) to counter the king’s spending plans. The business community convinced some native stalwarts—Joseph Nāwahi, G. W. Pilipo (“known as ‘Ka Liona o Kona Akau” (The Lion of the

91 “The Month of June,” The Friend, July 1, 1875:49.
92 Kirch and Sahlins 1992:118.
95 Kuykendall 1967:207-208
97 Kuykendall observed, “As the election of 1880 approached, the eligible voters of foreign birth exhibited their usual apathy.” (Kuykendall 1967:205) And then in December 1881, a Walter Gibson editorial similarly pointed out—meaning it as a criticism—the “growing apathy and indifference as to what men are elected to the Legislature” displayed by the foreign-born in Hawaii. (Kuykendall 1967:247) In other words, the foreign community was rather quiet politically at this point.
North) for his aggressive and determined defense of Native rights and Hawaiian independence\(^98\), J. W. Kalua\(^99\)—to join them for several election cycles in the 1880s, convinced as they were that Kalākaua and (later) Gibson’s “government was a mockery of ‘real’ government.”\(^100\) As a countermeasure to the business community’s mass meetings in 1880, Moreno and his native Hawaiian supporter held their own mass meetings. A new, sharper racial tone entered Hawaiian politics. Moreno and his supporters argued for the need to “cast down foreigners from official positions and to put true Hawaiians in their places, because to them belongs the country.”\(^101\) And even when the King eventually relented, dismissing Moreno and installing a new cabinet made up wholly of haoles, the racial bitterness only increased.

Indeed, it was inconceivable that racial resentment would decrease given the approach of the new man of the moment: Walter Murray Gibson. Gibson followed Moreno’s use of the race card in supporting Kalākaua’s extravagance. British Commissioner Wodehouse, no special friend of the Americans wrote of him:

> He is a very clever man, and has completely succeeded in making the … Hawaiian believe that he is his only real friend, and the champion of his race against the white man. Mr. Gibson's native journal has … been stirring up the natives against the whites…. The Kamehamehas and the old high chiefs … never made any attempt to draw a dividing line between the two races; and, until recently, the natives have been content to live side by side with the foreigner.\(^102\)

Walter Murray Gibson was every bit as colorful as Moreno and equally larger-than-life. He was talented, and ruthless; a formidable opponent. Kuykendall describes him thus:

> Gibson had great natural ability; he was gifted with an acute and inquiring mind, quick perception, facility in expression of his thoughts as a writer and speaker and in public discussion. In the rough and tumble of parliamentary debate, he had no superior. He was not handicapped, as some were, by a slavish devotion to factual accuracy.\(^103\)

With a flair for languages, enabling him to quickly master Hawaiian upon his arrival,\(^104\) his knowledge of the world was impressively large. He had lived for a time with exiled Mexican dictator Santa Ana, served as Consul General for several Central American states, traveled to Sumatra where he promptly triggered a revolt against the Dutch colonizers and an international incident between the US and Holland.\(^105\) He next found his way to Utah, convinced Brigham Young in 1861 to send him to the Hawaiian Islands to found a Mormon colony; whereupon, unknown to his fellow church members, he actually acquired title to the lands in his own name, and was eventually excommunicated for embezzlement.\(^106\) He then purchased some newspapers, giving himself a wide public, and got himself elected to the legislature in 1879, becoming King Kalākaua’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1882 and then his Prime Minister in 1886.

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\(^{98}\) Williams 2013:173.
\(^{100}\) Osorio 2002:210.
\(^{101}\) Kuykendall 1967:218-219. Kuykendall points out that while there had always been, since the 1820s, a degree of racial tension in Hawaii’s interracial society, “it had only rarely found serious expression.” (Kuykendall 1967:187)
\(^{102}\) Kuykendall 1967:251.
\(^{103}\) Kuykendall 1967:255-256.
\(^{106}\) Haley 2014:3345.
Gibson ingratiated himself with the King by supporting his free-spending ways. But the legislature’s finance committee objected in 1884, submitting a damning review of the administrations’ spending habits of the two preceding two years. Even Gibson’s own paper, the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, was forced to concede that the report “does show an astonishing negligence and lack of system in the conduct of the Government affairs.”

None of this slowed Gibson or the king down. An expensive world tour had been undertaken by the King in 1881 (the first monarch in the world to have done so); a fine new palace completed in 1882 (with electric lights and telephone and indoor plumbing, several years before the White House had either telephones or electricity), which far exceeded its originally estimated costs; a grand coronation event took place in 1883 demanding befittingly bejeweled crowns for the king and queen, followed by grands plans in 1885 for the forming of a pan-Polynesian confederation (Samoa, Tonga, the Gilbert Islands) with Hawaii’s king at its head, capped off by clumsy diplomatic maneuvering (triggering Germany’s declaration of war in late 1887 on Samoa’s King Malietoa) and Hawaii’s disastrous, expensive, commissioning to Samoa in early 1887 of a newly-armed sub-par steamer with a drunken crew. As Helena Allen—in her biography sympathetic towards Queen Liliuokalani and highly critical of the part played by Hawaii’s *haole*—noted:

> Between these two men [Gibson and Moreno], Kalākaua’s impulsive urge to lavish the wealth of the royal treasury was exploited and flattered…. Kalākaua was in the haze of grandiose ideas. Gibson … supported the weakest side of Kalākaua – the vainglorious desire to be the Napoleon of the Pacific.

The foreign community demanded change. The Hawaiian League—a secret reform organization begun in 1887 and made up mainly of *haoles* who were leaders in the community—was its instrument. It was a mix of radicals who envisaged the abolition of the monarchy and moderates simply wanting to rein it in. The league had its own military wing, the Hawaiian Rifles made up of 200 *haoles*, drilled and armed. With this wing at its back, the League went to the king in the summer of 1887 and demanded a new constitution, in the meantime putting Walter Gibson under

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109 Estimated to cost $80,000, the palace finally cost $246,509.07, the money having to be then siphoned off from other projects. (Kuykendall 1967:246)
110 Kuykendall 1967:262.
111 Kuykendall 1967:317f.
112 Allen 1982:152-4, 173. In a similar vein, C.B. Wilson, one of King Kalākaua’s bodyguards and the loyal Marshal to Queen Liliuokalani, according to Bob Krauss “was quoted later as saying he ‘thought Kalākaua had made many blunders as king,’ especially in appointing foreign adventurers [C. Moreno and W. Gibson] to high office and in allowing appallingly large government expenditures.” (B. Krauss, *Johnny Wilson: First Hawaiian Democrat* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 28.)
113 Kuykendall 1967:353.
114 Men such as Lorrin Thurston, W. A. Kinney, S. B. Dole, P. C. Jones, W. R. Castle, W. E. Rowell, C. W. Ashford, Major H. M. Benson, A. T. Atkinson, Dr. G. H. Martin, and Dr. N. B. Emerson. “All these men were prominent residents of Honolulu.” (Kuykendall 1967:347)
arrest. The king felt compelled to relent—hence the name “Bayonet Constitution”\textsuperscript{115}—and gave them their constitution.

It was a constitution designed to hobble the king’s prerogatives and his democratic support by stripping away his right to make and unmake his cabinet at will; by removing his absolute veto power over legislation; by removing his right to appoint the house of Nobles and instead making it an elective office, while adding a property ownership requirement for eligibility to the office; all the while watering down native Hawaiians’ voting power by extending the right to vote to non-citizen residents of American or European descent, so long as they fulfilled a minimum residential period (three year) and a minimum property ownership requirement.\textsuperscript{116}

Native Hawaiians were furious. They sensed control slipping away. Aliens were being allowed to vote. It was not, Hawaiian stalwart Nāwahī, said, a “constitution giving equal rights to all.”\textsuperscript{117} Hawaii’s monarch was increasingly being reduced to an almost ceremonial status. Indeed, the 1887 revolutionists\textsuperscript{118} idea was that the Hawaiian king should follow the pattern of Britain’s Victoria, to “reign but not rule.”\textsuperscript{119} As the post-1887 Cabinet told King Kalākaua:

> The Government in all its Departments must be conducted by the Cabinet, who will be solely and absolutely responsible for such conduct. Your Majesty shall in future sign all documents and do all acts … when advised so to do by the Cabinet.…\textsuperscript{120}

Increasingly, native Hawaiians felt themselves “under the grasp of the haoles.”\textsuperscript{121} The fact that the post-1887 Cabinet was all-haole only reinforced this sense.

What had been a “war of propaganda”\textsuperscript{122} entered its next even fiercer stage. The election of 1890 demonstrated a bitter and growing racial antagonism to the extent that the British Commissioner Wodehouse suggested to the American minister “that Guards for the English and American

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\item[115] As to King Kalākaua’s view that the Hawaiian League was prepared to use force, the American Minister Merrill reported his meeting with King Kalākaua, along with the British, French, Portuguese and Japanese Commissioners so: “When all had assembled His Majesty, evidently being much alarmed, stated that an armed force had recently arrested a late member of his Cabinet, Mr. Gibson, and as armed men were patrolling the streets, and not knowing what the next act might be, he desired to place the control of the affairs of the Kingdom in our hands.” (Kuykendall 1967:358-364) L. A. Thurston admitted the coercive backdrop to the Constitution, writing in his Memoirs: “An allegation has been made that the 1887 constitution was not legally enacted…. Unquestionably the constitution was not in accordance with law; neither was the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain. Both were revolutionary documents, which had to be forcibly effected and forcibly maintained.” (L. Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co., 1936), 153)
\item[116] Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, 1887, Articles 41, 48, 58, 59, 62. Available at: http://hooilina.org/cgi-bin/journal?e=p-0journal--00-0-0-004-Document---0-1--1en-50---20-docoptions-search-issue---001-0110escapewin&a=p&p=frameset&c1=&d=HASH01b8b242efc454f373219e66b5_1_6 The Constitution allowed non-citizen residents of “Hawaiian descent” to vote as well—along with the Americans and Europeans of this class—but this was window dressing given that in 1887 there were few, if any, such. Kuykendall observed: “[T]he voting privileges extended to resident aliens gave to the haoles as a group a greatly increased power in the government and reduced the Hawaiians to a position of apparent and, for a while, actual inferiority in the political life of the country.” (Kuykendall 1967:370)
\item[117] Kuykendall 1967:461.
\item[118] Many, both perpetrators and later sympathizers, were clear that the change was in the nature of a revolution: see the very title of Thurston’s book, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution; see “Death Takes W. H. Rice at Lihue, Kauai,” Honolulu Star Bulletin, June 16, 1924, pp. 1 & 3.
\item[119] Kuykendall 1967:347.
\item[120] Kuykendall 1967:430.
\item[122] Kuykendall 1967:274.
\end{footnotes}
Legations should be landed to-morrow morning from the English and American War Ships now in Port,” in order to keep the peace. In the end it was not necessary, but such were the tensions. The 1887 “Bayonet Constitution” was in many ways the key tipping point for Hawaii in terms of its political downfall. From this point onwards the relationship was no longer one of consensus between various parties; now it was a “war between two sides.” And in a war, only one side can win, with both sides being determined that they would be that side. The Hawaiians, feeling unjustly sidelined, were determined to overturn that injustice. The business community, feeling their concerns increasingly sidelined, grew increasingly dismissive of native Hawaiian concerns.

The new mood amongst the haole community can be seen in the changing political opinions of Lorrin Thurston (1838-1931), lawyer, politician, descendant of missionary grandparents, and leading shaker and mover both of the 1887 Bayonet Constitution and of the 1893 overthrow of the queen. As late as 1884 he had expressed, as editor of Hawaii’s Bulletin, a more hopeful note:

> For many years there have been a few residents here who have desired the annexation of these islands…. But the majority of intelligent, and especially those born here of foreign parents, have contended for the independence of the Government. They have believed it to be far more for the interests of the native race that they should maintain an independent Government and a distinctive national existence.

But subsequently his opinions changed radically. Thomas Rain Walker, British vice-consul in Honolulu wrote, after a visit to San Francisco in August, 1891:

> Thurston I met in San Francisco, and I was sorry how his patriotic enthusiasm for Hawaii had changed into a sort of hopelessness; he said that, with the large majority of 14,000 voters blind enough to be beguiled by Wilcox and Bush, whom neither monarch nor ministers could suppress, he did not see much future for Hawaiian independence, which he thought depended much upon the commercial credit of the country. As I said, I was sorry to learn … this view; for a few years ago I thought him one of the most hopeful and patriotic sons of Hawaii.

The lines were being fixed. It was no surprise, then, when Queen Liliuokalani collided headlong with the business community with devastating consequences.

**Downfall Step 2: 1893**

King Kalākaua died on January 20, 1891. His sister Liliuokalani ascended to the throne on January 29, 1891. Driven by the conviction that her brother had weakly and too easily yielded in 1887, and noting that thousands of native Hawaiians had expressed their dislike of the Constitution of 1887, Queen Liliuokalani decided on her own revolutionary step: bypassing the legislature, she secretly began working on a new constitution. Its entire purpose was to overthrow the constitution of 1887 and to return executive control into the hands of an active and commanding queen.

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125 Kuykendall 1967:510.
126 Kuykendall 1967:480, 583, 585.
127 Kuykendall comments, “The effect of these changes would have been to give the queen more power and more influence over the government than had been possessed by Kalākaua at the beginning of his reign.” (Kuykendall 1967:586) A.F. Judd, Chief Justice of Hawaii’s Supreme Court—admitted by Julia Siler, in her book highly critical of the haole community’s part in the queen’s overthrow, to have been “a staunch supporter of the queen” and to have “loyally served the monarchy until” learning of her new constitution (J. Siler, *Lost Kingdom: Hawaii’s Last Queen, the Sugar Kings, and America’s First Imperial Adventure* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012), 206)—opposed the queen’s constitution because it was “to make the term of [the supreme court] office six years,
On January 14, 1893, she prorogued the legislature, informed the cabinet ministers of her intention to proclaim a new constitution that afternoon, and instructed her Household Guard and her Marshal C.B. Wilson to be prepare to quell any riot from the opposition. However, on the very day she was to announce her new constitution, her cabinet ministers informed her they could not agree to it. Shocked and embittered, the queen postponed her plan. Seeing what was in the wind, a haole “Committee of Safety” formed and hastily drew up plans to resist the queen. Lorrin Thurston, acting for the so-called Committee of Safety, went to two of the queen’s ministers and announced the committee’s plans to set up a provisional government to immediately replace hers:

The Committee of Safety are not content to let matters rest as they are. The Queen has announced her intention, of promulgating the constitution when the opportunity presents itself, and they do not propose to sit over a volcano and wait for her to explode it when she chooses. We feel that there is no safety so long as she remains on the throne. We have acted with and supported you so far and desire to continue to do so if you are willing. Will you adopt the course which was discussed and agreed to by you yesterday, (i.e., to declare the Queen in revolution against the Government, declare the throne vacant and call on the people for support). If so, well and good, you can take control of the situation; otherwise the Committee intends to proceed on the lines indicated without you.128

Two days later, on January 16th the USS Boston landed 162 armed troops, ostensibly not to aid either side in the dispute, but to “prevent the destruction of American life and property.” The very next day, on January 17th, the Committee of Safety took over the government building with their own armed force, deposed the queen, proclaimed martial law, and then shortly thereafter sought and received from the American Minister Stevens recognition of the Provisional Government as “the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.”129

The queen provisionally surrendered herself while sending a protest to the U.S. government, asking the U.S. to step in and reinstate her as queen. The provisional government also sent a request to the United States: but in their case requesting annexation. On December 18, 1893, Grover Cleveland’s new minister to Hawaii came down firmly on the queen’s side, issuing a formal demand to the Provisional Government that they dissolve and restore the monarchy. The Provisional Government was having none of it, their President Dole responding to the demand five days later: “We do not recognize the right of the President of the United States to interfere in our domestic affairs.”130 For the next five years Hawaii remained an independent republic.

**Downfall Step 3: 1898**

That independence came to an end with the Spanish-American War of 1898. Up until then, the Republic of Hawaii had never been able to win the necessary majorities in the US Congress for annexation. All that changed when the US needed fueling stations to fight Spain in the Philippines. By joint resolution of Congress, Hawaii was annexed on August 12, 1898. Hawaii’s downfall as an independent nation was now complete and fixed.

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128 Thurston to John W. Foster (US Secretary of State), Feb. 21, 1893 (cited in Kuykendall 1967:589)
130 “Hawaiian Islands,” House Ex. Doc. No. 70, pp. 1274-1276. The American minister Willis had written to President Dole of “the President’s [Grover Cleveland] determination … that you are expected to promptly relinquish to her [Queen Liliuokalani] her constitutional authority.”
Of course, Hawaii’s story is not merely one of tragedy. The storm, which was the loss of her independence as a nation, was real and has left its damage. But even as nature recovers and as the sun rises again after the storm, so has Hawaii grown and prospered since 1898. She has not been crippled, but rather walks with a limp; meanwhile striding forward from strength to strength. It is not the purview of this paper to cover those subsequent positive developments, though I have touched on them elsewhere.\textsuperscript{131}

**Conclusion**

This paper has focused on the holistic mission purposes of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century Evangelical Mission to Hawaii: listing its spiritual, social and economic successes but also listing the mission’s disappointments—especially the loss of Hawaii’s independence as a nation in 1898. It then charted the steps leading to this loss of independence: starting with Hawaii’s leaders’ embrace of a market-oriented economic approach as a key to increasing their wealth and power, while not appreciating sufficiently the common Hawaiian’s lack of equipping for such a globalized market approach. The result of forging ahead economically—despite missionaries’ best efforts to avoid this through their training institutions—was the development of an increasingly divided society: Westerners who had the economic power and Hawaiians who had little economic power but still held political power. This was setting up a tinderbox ready to burst into fire at any moment.

And it did burst into fire as the business community increasingly found themselves at loggerheads with the political power, the king (and finally the queen). Conflict replaced cooperation; a win-lose approach replaced a win-win approach and it was the Hawaiian monarchy which here lost. The monarch was dethroned, Hawaii lost its independence and was annexed to the United States.

For BAM practitioners today, Hawaii’s 19\textsuperscript{th} century history is a reminder that Business as Mission always will involve far broader issues than just the narrowly economic; it will touch on deep cultural and political issues. BAM practitioners need to be prepared for this. Put another way: the lesson is that the reality of success will also bring additional complexities. This should not surprise us, nor need it dismay us.

\textsuperscript{131} See *Spiritus: ORU Journal of Theology*  Spring 2020.